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Understanding Perceptions of Senior Managers’ Safety Commitment 
by Kate C. Bowers 
Abstract 
The present study utilizes qualitative methodology to investigate how employees perceive 
senior managers’ commitment to safety. Fourteen participant interviews were conducted 
at two job sites of a national transit organization. Results suggest that a variety of sender, 
message, and receiver characteristics interact to impact perception formation. 
Participants’ descriptions of senior manager safety commitment included behaviours 
demonstrating engaged safety leadership, consistent safety leadership, the allocation of 
finances to safety, and implementation of policies and procedures that reflect a value for 
safety. Descriptions of a lack of safety commitment included behaviours reflecting 
unengaged safety leadership, inconsistent safety leadership, a neglect to allocate 
resources to safety, and implementation of policies and procedures that counteract the 
prioritization of safety. This study also investigated how employees discern the 
authenticity of senior manager safety commitment behaviours. Furthermore, the strongest 
indicators of safety commitment and lack of safety commitment are examined. 
Suggestions for practice and future research are discussed. 
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Section 1: Introduction  
 
“What you do speaks so loud, I cannot hear what you say.” 
-Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1875 
1.1 Rationale for the Present Investigation 
Safety is an integral part of organizational functioning, particularly for 
organizations in high-hazard industries. The financial and human costs associated with 
safety outcomes place safety as a top priority for most companies. Statistics from the 
Association of Workers’ Compensation Boards of Canada indicated that across all 
industries, a total of 241,934 time-loss injuries and 902 fatalities were reported in 2013 
(AWCBC, 2013a; AWCBC, 2013b). Moreover, in 2013 the cost of lost-time claims in 
Canada was over 5.5 billion dollars (AWCBC, 2013c). Understandably, these statistics 
are greatest in high-risk industries, including health and social service, manufacturing, 
and construction (AWCBC, 2013a). The significant loss attributed to organizational 
accidents has stimulated continuous research, development, and improvement to mitigate 
risk and improve safety.  
 Examinations of major disasters have identified organizational management as a 
crucial factor in shaping safety outcomes (e.g., Chernobyl; INSAG, 1998; Piper Alpha; 
Paté-Cornell, 1993; Deepwater Horizon; Presidents Report, 2011). Managers’ attitudes 
and behaviour regarding safety have been established to influence employee perceptions 
of manager safety commitment, in turn shaping employees’ attitudes and safety 
behaviour (Neal & Griffin, 2004). The notion of employee perceptions of manager safety 
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commitment and organizational safety practice has been largely defined as safety 
climate, and is popularly used in research and practice as an indication of the success of 
organizational safety functioning (Zohar, 2014).  
Large-scale meta-analytic investigations have identified safety climate as an 
antecedent of organizational safety outcomes. Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke’s 
(2009) meta-analysis of 90 studies examined person and situation-based antecedents of 
various safety outcomes. Person-based antecedents included personality, job attitude, 
motivation for safety and safety knowledge; whereas situation-based antecedents 
involved situation-related factors, such as safety climate (e.g., management commitment, 
safety systems, work pressures) and leadership. Results indicated that perceived manager 
commitment to safety significantly predicted enhanced safety performance and fewer 
accidents. Perceived manager commitment was supported to directly impact employees’ 
safety knowledge and safety motivation, in turn shaping employees’ safety performance. 
Clarke (2013) lends support to the previous finding that employee perceptions of 
management behaviour impact safety functioning. Clarke’s (2013) meta-analysis 
indicated that safety climate partially mediated the relationships of transformational 
leadership on safety participation and transactional leadership on safety compliance. This 
investigation highlights the positive influence of transformational and transactional 
leadership behaviours on safety outcomes.  
The aforementioned meta-analyses elucidate the role of leader behaviour in 
impacting employee perceptions and subsequently, organizational safety outcomes. 
Recently, the importance of perceptions of senior management in organizational safety 
research has been recognized (Flin, 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Presidents Report, 2011; 
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Zohar, 2014). Zohar (2014) suggests that the ability to improve safety outcomes is 
contingent on perceptions of sincere management commitment, and that these perceptions 
may differ for each level of management. In a review of the distinctive effects of 
supervisors, site managers, and senior managers on safety climate, Flin (2003) 
highlighted the importance of considering each level of management when assessing 
safety climate. In her review, Flin (2003) reasoned that senior manager’s safety 
commitment is demonstrated through allocation of resources, most importantly 
manager’s time, followed by money, and people. The frequency by which senior 
managers emphasize safety was also identified, including their attention and direct 
interest in safety processes as well as communicating the importance of safety to staff 
(Flin, 2003). Additional research has attempted to uncover more specific senior manager 
safety commitment behaviours (e.g., Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2013; Fruhen, 
Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2014a; Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2014b); however, these 
approaches adopt a narrow scope, focusing solely on senior managers’ self-reports of 
demonstrated commitment behaviour. Moreover, although recognized for their 
substantial contribution to organizational functioning (e.g., financial outcomes), senior 
managers have been largely neglected from empirical research regarding safety outcomes 
(Flin, 2003; Fruhen, et al., 2013; Fruhen et al., 2014a; Fruhen, et al., 2014b).  
 It is evident from the literature that management behaviour and decision-making 
has a powerful impact on employee perceptions of organizational safety, subsequently 
impacting employee safety practices. These findings provide rationale for the present 
study’s investigation of employee perceptions of senior manager safety commitment. 
Investigating how employees form perceptions of senior management’s safety 
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commitment will improve understanding of safety climate, fostering our ability to 
improve organizational safety functioning.   
1.2 Research Aim and Questions 
 The present study attempts to address the paucity of knowledge regarding how 
employees form perceptions of senior managers’ safety commitment. This study aims to 
shed light on the process of perception formation through qualitative research, a 
methodology supported to provide rich and in-depth information (Richards & Morse, 
2012). This research will provide insight on what senior manager safety commitment 
looks like to employees, including how perceptions are formed and how employees 
discern authenticity of senior manager safety commitment. Furthermore, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to develop a conceptual framework 
elucidating this process of perception formation. This framework draws on social 
psychology and economics literature to conceptualize how employees receive and 
interpret information from senior management and is used to guide the study’s research 
questions and data analysis. 
The overarching research question of this study is: through what processes do 
senior managers influence employee perceptions of safety commitment? Based on the 
previously discussed theoretical and empirical research, the following investigative 
questions are proposed:  
1. What does senior manager safety commitment look like to employees? 
a. What management behaviours reflect a lack of safety commitment? 
b. How do employees discern if management are authentic (versus unauthentic) 
in their safety commitment behaviour?  
 12 
2. What management behaviour most strongly signals safety commitment? 
a. What management behaviour most strongly signals a lack of safety 
commitment? 
3. What characteristics of route processing antecedents influence perception formation? 
a. What defines a high quality message (signal)? 
i. What makes a message strong, persuasive, and valid? 
ii. What descriptive aspects of a message are associated with greater 
quality? 
b. In what way are employees motivated to analyze messages of safety 
commitment (e.g., accuracy versus impression motivation)? 
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Section 2: Literature Review 
 
The following subsections aim to identify the process of leader influence and 
perception formation by drawing on four literatures: (1) literature on organizational safety 
(2) leadership literature (3) economics literature on signaling theory and (4) persuasion 
literature on models of information processing. This review begins by defining the 
constructs safety climate, safety culture, and manager safety commitment, followed by an 
examination of work in the area of senior management’s safety commitment. Next, the 
process of leadership influence is examined through a review of influence tactics and 
leadership styles. Finally, the process of perception formation is discussed by reviewing 
literature on signaling theory and information-processing models. The section closes with 
a summary identifying the gap in the literature the present study addresses and 
aggregating the reviewed literature to produce a conceptual framework of perception 
formation.  
2.1 Safety Climate, Safety Culture & Management Safety Commitment 
 In the present study, safety climate is operationalized as a group-level construct, 
representing employee’s shared perceptions, and defined by Zohar (2003) as: “shared 
perceptions with regard to safety policies, procedures and practices” (p.143). It is 
important to note that the term safety climate is distinct from safety culture. Safety 
culture is a more complex and multifaceted construct, representing shared values and 
beliefs regarding safety (Guldenmund, 2010). Safety climate (i.e., perceptions of manager 
commitment) is often assessed and used as an indication of an organization’s underlying 
safety culture (Guldenmund, 2010). Safety climate, however, is one facet of culture and, 
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thus, should not be assessed or represented as an organization’s state of culture. The 
more tangible construct of safety climate facilitates assessment, and measures have been 
linked to numerous safety outcomes, including accidents (e.g., Nahrgang, Morgeson, & 
Hofmann, 2011; Neal & Griffin, 2006), injury (e.g., Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 
2010; Nahrgang, et al., 2011; O’Toole, 2002), and motivation to engage in safe practices 
(e.g., Neal & Griffin, 2006). 
 Intricately related to safety climate and safety culture is the concept of manager 
safety commitment. Manager commitment to safety is formally defined as “the extent to 
which management is perceived to place a high priority on safety, and communicate and 
act on safety issues effectively” (Neal & Griffin, 2004, p. 27). Research demonstrates that 
manager commitment behaviour may be the most critical element in influencing 
employee safety behaviours (Beus, et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009). In addition to 
improving safety outcomes, manager safety commitment has been shown to improve 
non-safety related outcomes including job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and 
job-related performance, while reducing negative outcomes such as employee withdrawal 
behaviours (Michael, Evans, Jansen, & Haight, 2005). It is apparent that management 
safety commitment behaviours are integral to organizational functioning; however, much 
remains to be investigated concerning different levels of management and their unique 
influence on impression formation.  
2.2 Senior Management 
In their investigation of organizational safety climate, Zohar and Luria (2005) 
established that variation in climate exists among different departments of an 
organization, suggesting that intervention models should assume a multi-level 
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perspective. Adding to this, in a review of safety climate literature, Zohar (2010) 
identified the necessity to develop level-specific subscales of a climate measure, as 
employees develop level-specific climate perceptions. Furthermore, literature 
investigating the role of senior management in organizations has highlighted that this 
level of functioning has a unique impact on employee actions. Clarke (1999) investigated 
perceptions of train drivers, supervisors, and senior managers regarding the importance of 
25 railway factors. The author’s investigation also had each level provide estimates of the 
rating of the other levels. Results demonstrated that frontline employees (e.g., drivers) 
perceived local managers and supervisors as more concerned about safety than senior 
managers, indicating differences in perceptions of management levels. The following 
sections explore recent literature on senior manager safety commitment, identifying the 
importance of senior managers and theoretical reasoning for how perceptions of their 
commitment behaviour are formed.  
 The importance of senior management in shaping culture has grown in response 
to the Deep-Water Horizon accident in 2010. A report produced in response to the 
accident identified that an organization’s Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O) and board of 
directors must create a safe culture whereby all employees feel responsible and motivated 
to prevent accidents (President’s Report, 2011). In response to this document, 
publications have begun to investigate senior management commitment behaviour, 
including how this position shapes safety culture, and how managers promote safety 
commitment.   
Culture is a learned phenomenon communicated by leaders; employees must 
successfully perceive leader behaviours in order to learn relevant information (Schein, 
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2004). However, there is paucity of information surrounding senior leaders in 
organizational safety literature (Flin, 2003). Consistent with Flin’s (2003) notion that 
senior leader safety commitment is a reflection of executive's resource management, 
Zohar (2014) surmised that leaders’ commitment is largely perceived as investment in 
hazard control or risk management. Thus, the greater the investment of time and 
resources to reduce potential hazards and threats to safety, the greater the reflection of 
commitment, and consequently, stronger climate.  
 Fruhen et al. (2013) interviewed eight senior managers’ from two air traffic 
management organizations in Europe regarding their interpretations of safety culture. 
Results from content analysis demonstrated that for both organizations, senior managers 
most often described safety culture as a “just culture,” that is, an organization with trust 
and open communication between working members. A reporting culture was also 
popularly described, reflecting employee openness in reporting information. Lexical 
analysis revealed high frequency of the words “people” and “safety” reflecting a 
perception that an organization’s safety culture is contingent on the management of its 
members.   
 In a similar research study, Fruhen and colleagues (2014a) interviewed sixty 
senior managers (C.E.Os, direct reports to C.E.Os, and board members) from European 
and North American air traffic management organizations. Senior managers were 
interviewed and asked the open-ended question: “From your point of view in what ways 
can you show your commitment to safety?” (p. 35). Results suggested that problem-
solving, specifically the number of issues considered, information sources used, 
generation of ideas, and social competence involved, reflected senior leader commitment 
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to safety. Senior managers also reported that personal involvement in safety matters, 
influence on organizational attributes, and communication about safety, demonstrated 
safety commitment. Additionally, perceiving and understanding employees intentions and 
emotions were deemed a reflection of commitment.  
 In another two-part study, Fruhen et al. (2014b) investigated the personal 
attributes of senior managers that most influence safety outcomes. In part one, 76 senior 
managers (direct reports to C.E.Os) completed a questionnaire about characteristics ideal 
for a C.E.O’s influence on safety. Part two involved interviews with 9 senior managers to 
better define characteristics defined in part one. Combined results indicated six attributes 
demonstrating commitment to safety: (1) social competence (understanding others 
emotions and ability to persuade others), (2) safety knowledge (theoretical and practical 
understanding of safety issues, knowledge of facts and information), (3) motivation (goal 
motivation via context appropriate promotion or prevention focus; see Crowe & Higgins, 
1997), (4) problem-solving (understanding the problem, generating ideas and planning 
the implementation of ideas), (5) personality, and (6) interpersonal leadership skills 
(transactional, transformational, and authentic leadership characteristics). These attributes 
were defined as senior managers’ safety intelligence, defined as their understanding of 
safety issues and relevant policies regarding safety.  
 The aforementioned research suggests a variety of senior manager commitment 
behaviours that positively influence an organization’s climate, and consequently, safety 
outcomes. It remains unknown, however, if frontline employees perceive these 
behaviours as a reflection of safety commitment. To ensure that the previously 
established senior manager commitment behaviours influence climate, it must be 
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understood if, and how, employees form these perceptions. The following sections 
provide theoretical evidence to investigate the processes of leader influence and 
perception formation.  
2.3 Leader Influence  
2.3.1 Primary and Secondary Mechanisms   
Schein (2004) contends that leaders channel influence through two vehicles: 
primary embedding mechanisms and secondary articulation and reinforcement 
mechanisms. Primary mechanisms are more directly observable and attributable to an 
individual. These include what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control; how 
leaders teach and coach others; how leaders react to crises and critical incidents; how 
leaders allocate resources and rewards, and how leaders recruit, promote, and 
excommunicate workers (Schein, 2004). Secondary mechanisms are less directly 
observable or attributable to a specific leader. They include organizational design, 
structure, systems and procedure, rites and rituals of the organization, physical design of 
the organization, stories about important events and people, and formal statements of 
organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters (Schein, 2004). This philosophy 
highlights the numerous sources and mediums through which employees are informed 
about management’s safety commitment. 
2.3.2 Influence Tactics 
The notion of leader influence tactics has been established to explain how leaders 
guide employee behaviour (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980). Kipnis and Schmidt 
(1985) identified different styles of leadership influence, described as soft, rational, or 
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hard. Soft influence behaviour is associated with involving employees in decision-
making processes and arousing enthusiasm for participation. This form of influence is 
closely associated with transformational and authentic leadership styles, as soft influence 
is focused on transforming employee value systems to be aligned with leaders’ own. 
Rational tactics involve more persuasive leader behaviour and include offering reward for 
desired conduct and using factual arguments to foster agreement and garner desired 
behaviour (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). Transactional leadership is associated with use of 
rational tactics, as it focuses on promotion of rule compliance. Finally, hard influence 
tactics are defined by commanding acts (e.g., threat or pressure to comply) and are 
associated with authoritarian leadership (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985).  
More recently, Higgins, Judge, and Ferris (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 
influence tactics and work outcomes and identified influence tactics representative of 
soft, hard, or rational influence styles. The authors concluded that seven tactics were 
largely accepted as leader’s influencing behaviour: (1) assertiveness (using a forceful 
manner), (2) ingratiation (using likeability or friendliness), (3) rationality (using logical 
arguments), (4) exchange (bargaining), (5) upward appeals (using superiors to ensure 
sanction), (6) coalitions (rallying others to persuade a target), and (7) self-promotion 
(creating an appearance of competence). The identification of these tactics provides 
understanding of influence behaviour, and recognizes tactics management engage in 
when trying to lead followers. 
 In relation to organizational safety outcomes, Clarke and Ward (2006) found a 
significant relationship between employee’s safety participation and leader tactical styles 
of coalition, rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, and consultation. Furthermore, 
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safety climate mediated (inspirational appeals tactic) or partially mediated (rational 
persuasion and consultation tactics) influence styles with the exception of coalition, 
highlighting the powerful persuasion of soft style tactical influence. The next section 
explores a theoretical explanation for this influence processing using social exchange 
theory.  
2.3.3 Social Exchange and Authentic Leadership 
Safety leadership theory posits that employees learn from and form impressions of 
leaders through a process of social exchange (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). For 
example, transformational leaders exhibit care for employee welfare, inspire and motivate 
subordinates to adopt a similar mind frame (e.g., value for safety), and intellectually 
stimulate employees to take risks and engage in creativity (Clarke, 2013). Through these 
processes, subordinates personally identify with the leader and socially identify with their 
workgroup (Clarke, 2013). Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) defined authentic 
transformational leadership as leadership grounded in moral foundations. Specifically, 
leaders who are authentic in their interaction with subordinates demonstrate idealized 
influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized 
consideration. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) suggest that employees discern authentic 
versus unauthentic behaviour through a leader’s moral character and concern for others, 
the ethical values embedded in a leader’s standards, and the morality of a leader’s choices 
and actions that involve others.   
 Growing from the notion of authentic transformational leadership, authentic 
leadership has been established as an independent style of leadership that is similar to, but 
separate from, transformational leadership (Tonkin, 2013). Transformational leadership is 
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largely defined by behavioural characteristics, whereas authentic leadership is 
characterized by the personal characteristics of the leader (Avolio & Gardner, 2005). For 
example, a recent investigation of authentic leadership suggests the construct is 
comprised of four components: (1) self-awareness (awareness for one’s strengths and 
weaknesses and how one is viewed as a leader), (2) balanced processing (considering 
multiple perspectives), (3) relational transparency (presenting one’s real self), and (4) 
internalized moral perspective (behaviour is guided by one’s morals and values; 
Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008). Authentic leaders are 
suggested to have a strong sense of self that guides them in actions and decision-making 
(Avolio & Gardner, 2005). Moreover, it is thought that followers identify with authentic 
leaders and their values, subsequently adopting these values as their own (Avolio & 
Gardner, 2005).  
 It is important to distinguish authentic leadership from ethical leadership, a 
recently developed leadership style characterized by leaders who are honest, trustworthy, 
and engage in moral management promoting and maintaining ethical behaviour (Brown 
& Treviño, 2006). Ethical leadership primarily differs from authentic leadership in that it 
incorporates a transactional focus on moral management (reward and discipline) to ensure 
followers act in an ethical manner (Brown & Treviño, 2006). Comparatively, authentic 
leadership influences followers by leading by example; followers adopt values that are 
thought to be in line with authentic leader’s values (Avolio & Gardner, 2005). As well, 
this form of leadership is characterized by being true to oneself and engaging in self-
awareness (Aviolio & Gardner, 2005) aspects not representative of ethical leadership 
(Brown & Treviño, 2006). Thus, as described in leader influence, authentic leadership 
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utilizes more soft influence tactics and is thus more transformative and long lasting in 
its influence.  
 Eid, Mearns, Larsson, Laberg, & Johnsen (2012) propose a theoretical model 
linking authentic leadership and psychological capital to safety climate and safety 
outcomes. The authors contend that leaders with a strong safety focus positively shape 
perceptions of safety climate. Furthermore, it is suggested that authentic leadership 
influences subordinates’ psychological capital (hope, resilience, optimism, and self-
efficacy), and that psychological capital mediates the relationship between safety climate 
and observable safety outcomes. Although this model has not been empirically tested, it 
lends support to the notion that authentic leader behaviour shapes employee safety 
perceptions, subsequently influencing employee safety behaviour.  
 To best understand how perceptions of senior management’s safety commitment 
are formed, one must understand the leadership processes that are best supported to 
garner influence. Thus, identifying the actions employees perceive to be indicators of 
senior manager safety commitment will shed light on how individuals discern 
authenticity of senior managers, and subsequently, how employee behaviours are shaped. 
Zohar (2010) provides a more detailed theoretical conceptualization of the way 
perceptions of safety commitment are formed from leaders’ authentic behaviour through 
his description of consistency between enacted and espoused values. 
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2.4 Understanding Perception Formation 
2.4.1 Consistency in Enacted and Espoused Values 
 Zohar (2010) emphasized the importance of consistency between leaders’ enacted 
and espoused values in employee perceptions of leader safety commitment. Enacted 
policies are messages indicating a value for safety that are visible by employees; 
espoused values are the underlying, authentic value for safety that leader’s hold. As such, 
employees must determine if a signal of safety commitment (enacted value) is 
representative of (consistent with) that leader’s espoused value. As Zohar (2010) 
describes, determining the consistency of these values is a challenging task that occurs 
over time and across varying situations. Employees must analyze the words and actions 
of managers and compare their priorities across contexts to determine alignment. When 
alignment is experienced, employees perceive managers as authentically committed to 
safety. This process may be better achieved in forming perceptions of supervisor safety 
commitment, as exposure of enacted values in different contexts are more easily 
observed. Determining this alignment in upper management, however, is likely more 
difficult to achieve. Zohar (2010) contends that perceptions of senior management are 
formed through relevant organizational policies, procedures and practices, yet, it is 
difficult to envision how employees conclude consistency between senior management’s 
espoused versus enacted values through perception of organizational policy or other 
indirect processes. To better explicate the process of leader influence and perception 
formation, signaling theory and information-processing models will now be discussed. 
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2.4.2 Signaling Theory 
 First described in economics literature, signaling theory contends that information 
between two parties is relayed via a signal that must be interpreted by the receiving party 
(Spence, 2002). Signals are used by messengers when information asymmetry exists, or 
when different people know different things (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). 
For example, Zhang and Wiersema (2009) used signaling theory to investigate if 
attributes of a firm’s C.E.O impact how investors respond to C.E.O certification and 
consequently, the firm’s financial statements. Firm’s financial statements are not 
viewable by investors and this study investigated if investors would use observable 
attributes of the C.E.O (e.g., C.E.O with more external directorships) as an indication of 
the C.E.O’s certification, and by proxy, the firms financial worth. Results showed support 
for this notion, indicating that investors made inferences about firms’ financial worth by 
way of C.E.O attributes.  
 Recently, signaling theory has been applied in management literature to elucidate 
information processes between leaders and subordinates (Connelly et al., 2011). There 
has been an emergence in the use of signaling theory to describe top management team 
characteristics, including C.E.Os (Connelly et al., 2011); however, this literature review 
did not find signaling theory to be applied in the context of management commitment to 
safety. Similar to the aforementioned example of investor speculation of firm quality by 
way of C.E.O attributes, the principle of signaling theory can be applied to leader safety 
commitment and how employees infer quality of commitment through observations of 
behaviour and features of the organization.  
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 Connelly and colleague’s (2011) review described characteristics that impact 
the transmission and reception of a signal. The authors described four characteristics that 
impact signal interpretation: (1) signaler characteristics, (2) signal characteristics, (3) 
receiver characteristics, and (4) feedback/environment. The following sections are a brief 
summary of Connelly and colleague’s (2011) descriptions and apply these concepts to 
senior manager safety commitment: 
1) Signaler Characteristics  
Signaler characteristics represent aspects of the signal sender that impact 
the receiving of a message and include honesty and reliability. Honesty is 
described as “the extent to which the signaler actually has the unobservable 
quality being signaled” (p. 52) or in the case of senior manager safety 
commitment, the extent to which senior management truly values safety. 
Reliability is associated with “the combination of a signal’s honesty and fit” (p. 
52), akin to the credibility of a manager, or the extent to which senior 
management is perceived to value safety in the way they truly do (i.e., high 
reliability represents alignment between Zohar’s (2010) enacted and espoused 
values). 
2) Signal characteristics 
Signal characteristics are defined by signal cost, observability, fit 
(quality), frequency, and consistency. Signal cost is described as costs associated 
with sending a signal. For example, in the context of senior management, signal 
cost may represent the extent of resources used in promotion of safety (cost of 
time, finances, or manpower). Observability (intensity, strength, clarity, visibility 
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of a signal) represents the extent to which individuals can notice the signal. 
This includes how well employees can observe a signal of commitment by senior 
management. Fit includes how well the signal correlates with the unobservable 
characteristic. In the context of senior manager safety commitment, this includes 
how well the signal reflects the manager’s value of safety commitment. This 
characteristic is differentiated from honesty in that fit is a feature of the signal, 
where as honesty is a characteristic of the signaler. Frequency includes the 
number of times the signal is transmitted (how often particular messages of safety 
commitment are perceived) and consistency is defined as “agreement between 
signals from one source” (p. 52). Consistency in the context of safety commitment 
would include the agreement between different signals of senior leader 
commitment perceived by employees.  
3) Receiver characteristics 
 Receiver characteristics include receiver attention and interpretation. 
Receiver attention relates to how well recipients look for and pay attention to 
incoming signals. For example, how attentive employees are to messages of 
senior leader safety commitment. Receiver interpretation includes characteristics 
of the recipient that may distort or influence how the signal is perceived. This may 
include employee’s background experiences and ability to draw comparisons 
when interpreting incoming signals of senior manager’s safety commitment.   
4) Feedback/Environment Characteristics 
Characteristics of the feedback or environment that may influence 
signaling process include countersignals (feedback) or distortion. Countersignals 
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include responsive signaling by the receiver used to improve interpretation of 
the signal (e.g., an employee verifying the meaning of a manager’s statement). 
Distortion includes potential characteristics in the environment that may distort 
the receiving and interpretation of a signal. In the context of senior manager 
safety commitment, this includes organizational attributes through which signals 
are sent. Senior management may use e-mail to administer memos promoting 
their commitment to safety, however, if employees do not have access to 
computers (e.g., computer is broken at the worksite), the environment has 
impeded the success of this signal. Distortion may also apply to characteristics 
outside of the organization, such as how the media portrays senior management 
behaviour.  
 Applying the notion of signaling to senior managers in an organizational safety 
context, a signal should indicate a manager’s authentic commitment to safety. 
Incorporating Zohar’s (2010) notion of enacted and espoused values, senior managers 
who are consistent in demonstration of commitment behaviour are perceived as high 
quality by way of this signal. Managers who are not genuine in their safety commitment 
would likely find demonstrating commitment behaviour consistently too costly and 
would prioritize production over this value, demonstrating a lack of commitment on 
various occasions (lack of consistency). As such, informational signals allow individuals 
to form impressions about the consistency of a leader’s behaviour over time and context, 
revealing their enacted and espoused values, and thus, their dedication to safety. The 
aforementioned literature supports that signals of safety commitment may be directly 
observed or inferred through indirect sources, such as stories by colleagues, or from the 
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work environment (Connelly et al., 2011; Flin, 2003; Schein, 2004; Zohar, 2010). In 
summary, these findings support that signals of safety commitment come from one of 
three channels of influence: leader decisions, leader behaviours, and other informants (see 
Table 1). 
The process through which information is managed has been shown to impact 
perception formation and the longevity of beliefs. As such, this study reviews 
information-processing models from literature on persuasion to help to explicate the 
cognitive processes involved in the interpretation of signals. The alignment of an 
information process model and signaling theory is subsequently discussed, establishing a 
conceptual framework for the proposed study.  
Table 1 
 
Channels of Senior Management Influence 
Channel  Description Examples 
Leader decisions Senior leader decisions 
that produce observable 
outcomes reflecting safety 
commitment 
 
Allocation of resources (time, 
money, people), response to 
safety events, how safety 
practice is rewarded, written 
statements about safety 
 
Leader behaviours Senior leader actions that 
are directly observable and 
reflect safety commitment  
 
Wearing safety equipment, 
abiding by safety rules/policies, 
statements about safety 
  
 
Other Informants Senior leader decision-
making or behaviour 
reflecting safety 
commitment that is 
relayed by an indirect 
source  
Stories from colleagues, 
friends, supervisors, article in a 
magazine or newspaper, union 
discussion, recognition by 
industry peers 
(e.g., safety award), news story 
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2.4.3 Models of Information-Processing 
 In the context of senior leader safety commitment, individuals must analyze and 
process information to discern if managers are authentic in their commitment to safety 
(e.g., scrutinizing the consistency between leaders’ enacted and espoused values). 
Identifying the information that individuals analyze in forming perceptions of senior 
leader safety commitment provides the first step in understanding how these messages are 
processed and their impact on perceptions. In addition to the aforementioned signaling 
theory, research in the social psychology literature has produced dual-processing models 
to explain information processing in persuasion contexts. The premise of dual-processing 
models of persuasion is that individuals are motivated to hold valid attitudes (i.e., are 
motivated to maintain accurate information). These models contend that the extent of 
effort one uses to analyze message content (i.e., elaboration) can have a lasting impact on 
attitude formation (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
Dual-processing models have been adapted for use in understanding information 
processing in a variety of contexts involving person perception and the evaluation of 
evidence (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). For example, risk perception (e.g., Ryu & 
Kim, 2014), workplace conflict (e.g., Douglas, Kiewitz, Martinko, Harvey, Kim, & Chun, 
2008), and online consumer behaviour (e.g., Sher, & Lee, 2009) have used dual-
processing models to explore the functioning of information processing.  
Two of the most popular dual-processing approaches include the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty, & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model 
(HSM; Chaiken, 1987). These models share many similarities and suggest that 
information processing occurs through one of two processes to form judgements: (1) low 
 30 
cognitive effort (relying on heuristic cues) or (2) high cognitive effort (analyzing 
information content). The processing strategy an individual uses to interpret information 
can greatly impact what individuals take away from the message (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Messages evoking greater cognitive processing inspire attitudes that are 
resistant to change, whereas relying on more superficial cues promotes weaker attitude 
development (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The defining difference between the two models 
of processing is that HSM has been further developed to account for interactive effects 
between processing routes (Larson, 2012). The ELM functions under the assumption that 
processing routes are distinct and act inversely (as one engages in high cognitive 
processing, peripheral route processing diminishes), while the HSM contends that one 
may engage in both routes of processing (using superficial cues while also scrutinizing 
the information content of a message; Larson, 2012). 
2.4.4 Heuristic-Systematic Model 
The HSM contends that information processing occurs through two mechanisms: 
(1) heuristic processing and (2) systematic processing (Chaiken, 1987). Heuristic route 
processing involves relying on heuristic cues, such as status of the message sender (e.g., 
an expert), to evaluate information. Use of judgement-relevant heuristics depends on the 
availability, accessibility, and applicability of cue-relevant information (Todorov, 
Chaiken, & Henderson, 2002). Cue information must be available (stored knowledge), 
accessible (recallable knowledge), and applicable (knowledge is relevant to the perceived 
message; Todorov et al., 2002). For example, a consumer deciding to buy a new cell-
phone may choose a brand that is popularly purchased by other individuals. Conversely, 
systematic processing involves greater cognitive managing, whereby individuals analyze 
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the content of messages to determine the validity of the message and form an opinion 
(Todorov et al., 2002). For example, a consumer may compare the function of a variety of 
cell-phone brands prior to purchase. Much like in the ELM, the likelihood to engage in 
systematic versus heuristic processing depends on individuals’ motivation and ability to 
analyze the message (Chaiken, 1987). Individuals who are highly motivated (i.e., find the 
message highly relevant) and able (i.e., are knowledgeable in the area) are much more 
likely to engage in systematic processing (Chaiken, 1987). Motivation of information 
processing was first proposed to be in the form of accuracy seeking; individuals are 
driven to maintain an objectively true representation of reality, thus analyzing the validity 
of presented information (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). More recent 
developments in the model, however, have incorporated impression motivation 
(motivation to hold attitudes viewed favourably in an interpersonal context) and defense 
motivation (motivation to hold attitudes congruent with existing self-definitional 
attitudes) to explain reasoning for information processing (Chaiken et al., 1996).  
 In line with Zohar’s (2010) notion of employees’ efforts to discern alignment 
between manager’s enacted and espoused values, employees are likely motivated to 
discern if signals of senior management’s priority for safety (enacted values) reflect 
authentic commitment (espoused values). Therefore, accuracy-seeking motivation best 
applies in this context, as individuals are likely motivated to analyze information in the 
process of ensuring validity (i.e., that a manager is genuine in his or her commitment). 
Impression motivation may also apply in this context when information is shared among 
working members. Individuals may be motivated to analyze information in a manner that 
aligns perceptions with the greater social group. For example, if an individual is 
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motivated by a sense of belonging to his or her workgroup, he or she may be motivated 
to maintain an attitude consistent with the colleagues in that group.    
2.4.4.1 Sufficiency Principle  
The HSM assumes that individuals are motivated to process information in the least 
effortful way, referred to as economy-minded information processing (Todorov et al., 
2002). However, this processing is attenuated when message receivers are highly 
motivated to analyze information (Todorov et al., 2002). The balance between utilizing 
minimal effort while satisfying motivational concern is referred to as the sufficiency 
principle (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). Thus, in the context of processing 
indicators of senior leader commitment, individuals are likely motivated to engage in 
systematic processing of a message if heuristic cues do not provide sufficient evidence to 
determine commitment. This principle highlights the importance of sender, message, and 
receiver characteristics, as these features likely combine to influence the route of 
information processing and perception formation. 
2.4.5 Antecedents of Heuristic versus Systematic Processing  
There has been significant investigation concerning the antecedents of 
information processing in various contexts, and research has shown a complex and 
intricate relationship among antecedent variables (e.g., Griffin, Neuwirth, Giese, & 
Dunwoody, 2002). Understanding the mechanisms that encourage systematic versus 
heuristic route processing allows individuals to engage in persuasion or information 
sharing tactics that foster more longstanding attitude change. The following sections 
explore these antecedents.  
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2.4.5.1 Source Characteristics  
In the context of persuasion and risk perception research, information involving 
the message sender, message content, and receiver of the message are supported to 
influence the route of processing. The credibility, trust (e.g., Trumbo & McComas, 2003), 
likeability, and expertise (e.g., Chaiken & Eagly, 1983) of the sender have been 
investigated in relation to information route processing. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) define 
source credibility as the extent to which an information source is perceived to be 
believable, competent, and trustworthy. Credibility is therefore inextricably linked with 
authenticity; individuals who perceive a leader as authentic must also infer characteristics 
of credibility (e.g., believable and trustworthy). ELM suggests that credibility influences 
processing of information whereby when individuals have low involvement (low message 
relevance) high credibility stimulates use of heuristic cue (peripheral) processing (e.g., 
relying on the expert; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Petty et al.’s (1981) study also 
suggests that when information is highly relevant and individuals are able to analyze 
message content (i.e., have sufficient prior knowledge), the cue of credibility is less 
influential in information processing, as individuals are more focused on message 
content. Petty et al. (1981) note, however, that in the context of high ability and 
motivation to scrutinize a message, strength of the argument will be the greatest influence 
in attitude change, but high credibility works to enhance this process.  
Research has also explored the impact of multiple source characteristics on 
individual perceptions. Ziegler, Diehl, and Ruther (2002) found that different 
combinations of source characteristics impacted the amount that individuals’ scrutinized 
message content. Argument quality is supported to influence attitudes when inconsistent 
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source characteristics were perceived (e.g., a high quality argument led to more 
agreement when the source was an expert but disliked, or a novice but liked). The 
inconsistency in source characteristics is supported to motivate the recipient, fuelling an 
analytic mode of processing to mitigate the discrepancy (Ziegler et al., 2002). Thus, 
differences in perceived sender characteristics may stimulate different route processing 
and, subsequently, differences in the changes of perceptions.   
2.4.5.2 Message Quality 
In the persuasion literature, message quality is typically referred to as the strength 
of an argument or an argument’s ability to persuade attitude change. For example, 
Bhattacherjee and Sandford (2006) define argument quality as “…the persuasive strength 
of arguments embedded in an informational message” (p. 811). Thus, a high quality 
message will be one that is perceived as strong, persuasive, and valid and convinces the 
receiver of the relayed message.  
Quality of a message may also be described in terms of clarity, accuracy, 
vividness, convenience, and other descriptive aspects of message content (Chaiken, 1980; 
Petty et al., 1981). Research on attitude formation has found that differences in these 
features can contribute to alternate information route processing (Chaiken & Eagly, 
1983). As such, it is supported that both descriptive (clarity, medium/richness, salience) 
and more broadly considered aspects of message quality (i.e., strength, persuasiveness, 
and validity) contribute to information processing and perception formation. 
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2.4.5.3 Receiver Characteristics 
Individuals’ motivation and ability to analyze message content have been long 
supported as determinants of route processing (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Todorov et al., 2002). In their review of HSM literature, Todorov and colleagues (2002) 
note that variables affecting one’s ability to process information include distraction, 
message repetition, time pressure, communication modality, and knowledge and 
expertise. As well, the authors surmise that motivation impacts an individual’s 
engagement in route-processing, including an individual’s need for cognition, perceived  
importance of a task, message relevance, accountability for one’s attitudes, and exposure 
to unexpected message content. These variables exemplify the complex nature of attitude 
formation and the variety of influences that can impact this process. 
2.5 Aligning Signaling Theory and the HSM 
 The aforementioned sections provide descriptions of signaling theory and 
information processing models. Considerable alignment exists between these models in 
that they both attempt to elucidate the complex process of information transfer and 
interpretation. In describing the process of influence, both theories identify sender, 
message, and receiver characteristics that can impact the interpretation of a message. 
Regarding sender characteristics, signaling theory and the HSM suggest that honesty 
(authenticity of value for safety) and credibility (convincingness of underlying value 
through the signal that is sent) are primary mechanisms influencing perception. Message 
characteristics are also aligned between these schools of thought whereby the quality of a 
message is characterized as its strength or fit (how well the message convinces the 
receiver of the leaders underlying value for safety). Additionally, these theories suggest 
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that descriptive aspects of signals can impact perception formation, such as clarity, 
vividness, frequency, and consistency. Receiver characteristics identify the importance of 
recipient’s ability and motivation to receive a signal. Signaling defines receiver 
characteristics as attention and interpretation, while the HSM describes the characteristics 
ability and motivation. The following study adopts the HSM’s terms ability and 
motivation in describing receiver characteristics and contends that motivation and ability 
impact an individual’s attention and interpretation.  
It should also be mentioned that in addition to sender, message, and receiver 
characteristics, signaling theory identified feedback (countersignals) and environment 
(distortion) influencing mechanisms. These attributes were not investigated in the present 
study in attempt to maintain a narrow scope of focus. The influence of these mechanisms 
on the receiving and interpretation of messages is suggested for future research.  
 Information from signaling theory and information-processing models was used 
to develop a conceptual framework representing employee perception formation of senior 
manager safety commitment. In combination with the other information in this literature 
review, the model was used to generate the study’s research questions and coding 
framework used in data analysis. 
2.6 A Conceptual Framework 
 Figure 1, a conceptual framework, depicts the process of senior leader safety 
commitment information transfer and employee interpretation. As shown in the 
framework, signals are channelled from one of three sources: leader decisions, 
behaviours, or other informants. Furthermore, sender, message, and receiver 
characteristics impact the way signals are cognitively processed (heuristic and/or 
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systematic processing), leading to perception formation. To this researcher’s 
knowledge, the process of employee perception formation of senior leader safety 
commitment has not yet been represented nor investigated in a scientific capacity. The 
framework therefore provides a basis for the generation of this study’s research questions 
and coding framework for data analysis.  
Coinciding with the left side of the framework (leader decisions, behaviours, and 
other informants), this study first aims to identify sources of manager safety commitment. 
That is, what management behaviours and/or decisions influence perceptions of safety 
commitment? The middle of the framework represents the characteristics that can impact 
cognitive processing of information (the receivers characteristics, characteristics of the 
sender, and characteristics of the actual message). It is suggested that these characteristics 
differentially impact the level in which information will be cognitively processed 
(heuristic versus systematic). Correspondingly, these processes prompt investigation of 
the specific characteristics that influence perception formation. For example, how are 
individuals motivated to identify and think about messages of leader safety commitment? 
Combined, this framework represents the overarching research question posed in this 
investigation: what does senior leader safety commitment look like to employees?  





Figure 1. Conceptual framework depicting the process through which perceptions of senior leader safety commitment are formed. Signals are 
received from one of three sources (leader decisions, leader behaviours, or other informants). Sender, message, and receiver characteristics impact 




Section 3: Method 
The present study adopted qualitative methodology using one-on-one interviews 
with frontline employees to understand perception formation of senior leader safety 
commitment. Merriam (2014) defines qualitative research as a method that “…focuses on 
meaning in context [and] requires a data collection instrument that is sensitive to 
underlying meaning when gathering and interpreting data” (p. 2). The present study aims 
to explore the process of employee perception formation and therefore to learn from 
participant experiences and interpretations. Qualitative investigation is suggested for use 
when “a problem or issue needs to be explored” (i.e. investigation of variables not easily 
measured; Creswell, 2013, p.47). Experimental methods typically facilitate studies of 
causation or prediction, whereas qualitative analysis aids in “uncovering the meaning of a 
phenomenon for those involved” (Merriam, 2014, p.5). Qualitative methods also facilitate 
analysis of complex information by allowing collection of rich and in-depth data and 
multiple ways to view data and identify emergent themes (Richards & Morse, 2013). This 
mode of inquiry is therefore most appropriate for the present study. 
3.1 Participants 
Fourteen participants from two worksites at a national transit organization were 
recruited for this study using convenience sampling. Participant inclusion criteria 





3.2 Materials and Measures 
A semi-structured interview (see Appendix A) was used in this investigation as it 
provided the flexibility to evaluate participants’ responses and probe appropriately to 
garner more detailed information (Fylan, 2005). The semi-structured interview is a 
method best suited for research cases where “…the researcher knows enough about the 
study topic to frame the needed discussion in advance…” (Richards & Morse, 2013, p. 
127-128). Furthermore, semi-structured interviews provide in-depth information 
regarding participants’ experiences and perceptions (Fylan, 2005). In comparison to focus 
groups, interviews provide participants the opportunity to express their opinions 
confidentiality, promoting honest answers. Evidence suggests that focus group 
participation may result in conformity, whereby participants withhold information and 
contribute polarized views that align with the greater group (e.g., Sussman, Burton, Dent, 
Stacy, & Flay, 1991).  
The semi-structured interview guide was created using a modified version of 
Flanagan’s (1954) critical incident technique. Flannagan (1954) stated that to be critical, 
“an incident must occur in a situation where the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly 
clear to the observer and where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little 
doubt concerning its effects” (p. 327). Examples of interview questions included: “think 
of a manager who is committed to safety. How do you know this senior manager is 
committed to safety?” Prompts were used to stimulate discussion regarding perceptions 
of senior leader commitment behaviour. 
 A demographic survey assessing participants’ age, gender, current employment 




recorded using an IPhone 4s and stored on a password-protected laptop computer. 




Participants were solicited by approaching management of a national transit 
organization in Canada. A member of management was e-mailed by the researcher and 
arrangements were made to complete interview sessions at two worksites. The 
organization solicited employee participation and scheduled interview attendance. The 
organization provided a private room on site at both Halifax and Moncton locations for 
the interviews. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
Interviews were conducted on two days in the same week. Interviews on each day 
began at roughly 8:30am and ended around 5:30pm. At the beginning of each interview, 
the participant was provided an informed consent form detailing voluntary participation, 
study content, and confidentiality of the data (see Appendix C). This information was 
explained in detail by the interviewer and participants were given the option to refrain 
from participating. Prior to participation any questions were answered and participants 
were asked additional verbal consent before audio recording commenced. 
Fourteen one-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted to investigate 
employee perceptions of senior manager safety commitment. Interview content included 




followed by 40-45 minutes of manager safety commitment discussion. Interview 
guides were used during interview sessions to ensure consistency in interviewee 
experience (see Appendix D). At the end of each interview session participants were 
given a feedback form thanking participants for their participation and providing contact 
information for the researcher, research advisor, and university ethics (see Appendix E). 
3.3.3 Data Saturation 
 This study followed principles outlined by Francis et al. (2010) to ensure the 
participant sample resulted in data saturation. Data saturation occurs when “no new 
themes, findings, concepts, or problems, [are] evident in the data” (Francis et al., 2010, 
p.4). The exploratory nature of this study and complexity of research and interview 
questions supported initial use of a sample of 10 participants. The researcher reviewed 
field notes after day one of interviews and noted consistent ideas and themes across the 8 
interviews. On day two of interviews review of field notes suggested saturation had been 
met at 10 interviews as no new themes or ideas were noted. Four more interviews were 
conducted and notes were compared to ensure no further ideas or themes were brought 
up. At this point the researcher was confident that saturation was met.  
3.3.4 Ethics 
 The proposed study involved no direct threat or risks to participants. To mitigate 
risk of employees feeling uncomfortable when discussing manager safety commitment or 
lack of safety commitment, identifying information was omitted in all research 
documents produced from the data. Furthermore, participants were informed that 




(July 15th). The researcher’s contact information and contact information for the Saint 
Mary’s University research ethic board was supplied to participants in case any questions 
or issues arose after interview completion. The Saint Mary’s University research ethics 
board provided ethical approval for this study.  
3.4 Qualitative Analysis 
3.4.1 Qualitative Paradigm 
A qualitative paradigm is a set of assumptions and beliefs that dictate one’s 
worldview and the nature of reality (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Within the realm of 
qualitative research, this researcher most closely associates with the postpositivist 
paradigm. This perspective maintains a scientific approach to research and individuals 
working under this paradigm recognize that cause and effect is not absolute (Creswell, 
2012). Instead, postpositivists assume that all cause and effect is “a probability that may 
or may not occur” (Creswell, 2012, p.23). The postpositive approach uses a logical, step-
by-step process in analysis and qualitative studies are typically written in the form of 
scientific reports (Creswell, 2013). Guba and Lincoln (1994) outline three fundamental 
questions that outline the functioning of a paradigm. These include (1) the ontological 
question (what is the nature of reality?), (2) the epistemological question (what is the 
nature of the relationship between inquirer and what can be known?), and (3) the 
methodological question (how can the inquirer find out this information?). With respect 
to ontology, postpositivism subscribes to critical realism; the belief that objective reality 
exists but that humans are unable to perfectly assess this reality (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 




understands that “it is possible to approximate (but never fully know) reality” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 111). Methodologically, the postpositivist paradigm supports use of 
experimental investigation through qualitative techniques, including completion of 
inquiry in natural settings.  
3.4.2 Thematic Analysis 
Consent for audio recording was provided by each participant and a professional 
transcriptionist was hired to provide transcripts of the audio data. To ensure data 
integrity, transcripts were assessed for accuracy by listening to twenty seconds of each 
audio recording at three time points throughout the interview (beginning, middle of 
interview, end of interview) and reading transcribed text. Next, the steps of thematic 
analysis as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006) were followed: 
Phase 1:Data Familiarization. Data familiarization was obtained through 
repeated readings of interviews. Interviews were read in full by the researcher and 
checked for accuracy, a process that furthered data familiarization. Prior to coding of the 
interview text, transcripts were read in full and notes were taken regarding apparent 
themes and patterns in the text. The number of interviews (N=14) facilitated strong data 
familiarization. 
Phase 2: Generating Initial Codes. Interviews were read individually and the text 
was assessed for meaningful and relevant content, facilitated by the researcher taking 
notes during the initial read-through. Codes were assigned using a hybrid approach of 
inductive and deductive analysis following an example by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 
(2006). In adopting a deductive approach, codes were generated following a coding 




Appendix F). Initial codes were manually assigned using Microsoft Word© track 
changes to segments of text reflecting information relevant to the research questions. Text 
representing a code was copied and pasted into a Microsoft Excel© spreadsheet 
containing a list of code names and interviews. Following an inductive approach, text 
representing phenomena not included in the initial coding framework were coded and the 
new code was added to the framework. After initial coding, interviews were reassessed 
by the researcher to double check codes. Upon completion of coding, a total of 107 codes 
were identified (65 of these codes derived from the data).  
Phase 3: Searching for Themes. Theme generation was initiated after coding of 
data. The spreadsheet containing a list of all codes and associated text representations 
was reviewed and similar codes grouped together in a separate word document. Theme 
development followed Braun and Clarke’s criteria for defining a theme: “a theme 
captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and 
represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (p.10). 
Moreover, themes were identified at the semantic level whereby themes were identified 
by the surface meaning of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Grouped codes were given a 
potential thematic title and this process was repeated until the sorting of codes was 
exhausted. Potential groups of codes and theme titles were assessed to determine themes, 
sub-themes, and data belonging to these overarching groupings. Preliminary analysis 
revealed 4 overarching candidate themes that included dimensions of commitment and 





 engaged safety leadership (active safety leadership, open safety leadership, 
respectful leadership) 
 consistency in safety leadership (consistency in safety leadership, resolute in 
position to work safely) 
 allocating resources to safety (allocating money to safety and allocating 
manpower to safety) 
  policies and procedures reflect a value for safety (management of safety is people 
focused and safety is a priority in policies and procedures). 
Themes and associated subthemes were compiled into a table and accompanied by 
detailed descriptions.   
Phase 4: Reviewing Themes. Review of themes began by investigating each 
theme individually to determine if it could be refined as well as reviewing theme 
similarities to determine if themes could be combined. The preliminary theme table was 
sent to two committee members for review and discussion and prompted revision of 
themes. As a result of these discussions, themes were further divided to better represent 
the indicators of commitment and lack of commitment. Four additional themes with 
subthemes were generated, including:  
 unengaged safety leadership (passive safety leadership, lack of transparency in 
safety leadership, lack of respectful leadership)  
 inconsistency in safety leadership (inconsistent leadership behaviour, value for 
production exceeds value for safety) 
 neglecting to allocate resources to safety (neglecting to allocate money to safety, 




 policies and procedures counteract safety prioritization (no identified 
subthemes).   
The primary four themes remained with slight modifications made, for a total of eight 
candidate themes.  
Phase 5: Defining and Naming Themes. Analysis of the data revealed eight 
candidate themes and fourteen subthemes. Of these themes, four emerged as indicators of 
safety commitment, and the remaining four represented a lack of safety commitment. The 
four themes reflecting a priority for safety included: (1) engaged safety leadership, (2) 
consistency in safety leadership, (3) allocating money to safety, and (4) policies and 
procedures reflect a value for safety. The additional themes that reflected a lack of safety 
commitment included: (5) unengaged safety leadership, (6) inconsistency in safety 
leadership, (7) neglecting to allocate resources to safety, and (8) policies and procedures 
counteract safety prioritization. After further review, slight modifications were made to 
two subtheme titles. After finalizing the themes, detailed summaries were created to 
describe the essence of themes and support final theme titles (discussed below; see 
appendix G for a concise table of themes, subthemes, and descriptions).  
3.4.3 Analyzing Authenticity and Antecedents of Route Processing 
Participant responses regarding senior manager authenticity were analyzed by 
reviewing individual responses and aggregating shared ideas. A similar approach was 
taken to identify and collect information regarding antecedents of information route 
processing. Transcripts of interview data were coded to identify the source of 
information, including direct (management behaviours, decisions) and indirect (other 




coding features representative of these constructs; all identified characteristics were 




Section 4: Results 
The purpose of this study was to explicate the process of how employees form 
perceptions of senior management’s safety commitment. Participant ages ranged from 21 
to 66 years with a mean age of 40. Eight participants (57%) indicated having met a 
member of senior management in their present organization. Experience in the 
transportation industry varied greatly among participants, averaging 8 years and ranging 
from 1 year to 30 years. Participants were all English speaking and average interview 
time across the 14 interviews was 46 minutes and 15 seconds. 
4.1 Theme 1: Engaged Safety Leadership 
 Senior leader commitment to safety was often described through leadership 
behaviours demonstrating active involvement in worksite safety management, an open 
and approachable demeanour, and respect for employees. This included having senior 
management visit the worksite and feeling able to approach and converse with these 
members. More importantly, participants stated that commitment was a reflection of 
senior management who discussed safety at their site and who were knowledgeable about 
policy and procedure. Maintaining a preventative approach by being actively involved at 
the worksite and open to accepting questions and concerns was also a consistent 
description. Aligned with this notion was mention of feeling respected and valued by 
senior management. Three subthemes that were identified within engaged safety 
leadership included: (1) active safety leadership, (2) open safety leadership, and (3) 
respectful leadership. 
Active Safety Leadership. Within engaged safety leadership was a consistent 




manager who is committed to safety as someone who is visibly involved in safety 
matters. This included visiting the worksite more than once per year, discussing safety 
matters with employees, addressing employee safety concerns in a timely manner, 
commending safety compliance, and using a coaching style of leadership in lieu of only 
punitive action. Active involvement at the frontline level was also provided as an 
example of the strongest indicator of senior management’s safety commitment. One 
participant described safety commitment as: 
"walking, walking around, walking on the property. […] going out to the job sites, 
maybe spending an hour or two with the crew, section crew and their vehicle, 
whether they’re going to a work place, just get on the work site, do a quick job 
review with them. How did this go, how did that go, what’s the process." 
Moreover, a significant overarching trend within active safety leadership was senior 
management having an understanding of frontline employee work conditions and tasks. 
Employees described that senior management commitment is reflected in a leader who is 
knowledgeable of the day-to-day operation at the frontline level and who makes 
executive decisions based on first-hand knowledge. One participant described that senior 
management’s safety commitment could be enhanced by taking these steps: 
“…get involved, like and I don’t know, I’ve never met them so I can’t say they 
probably have lots of stuff they’re doing, I understand that, they’re busy guys but 
if you’re making decisions that big, they need to know what they’re deciding on, 
not just look at a couple of pieces of paper that have a budget on it and say no 




Similarly, another participant described how more active involvement would enhance 
his perception of senior management’s commitment to safety: 
“getting out there in the fields, and seeing their employees work, seeing how they 
do things and I know they’re obviously super busy too but that should be, that 
would be one of the things that I would think that would really help.”  
Participant descriptions also indicated that safety commitment was reflected in senior 
leader’s management of supervisors and other levels of management. Observations of 
supervisor and mid level management’s safety commitment (e.g., involvement in safety 
matters, allocating resources to safety, openness and communication) were attributed to 
senior manager’s leadership. For example, one participant described that management 
making safety a priority was an initiative driven from the top down:  
“Always, always. Like that’s top three like [unclear] like we don’t care if the 
train’s late, we don’t care you know, you feel like you’re being rushed, you’re not 
rushed, it’s not a race, it’s safety first […] it’s a message from the seniors right 
down.” 
This notion was also mentioned by a participant when describing that allocation of 
resources to safety demonstrates commitment and is managed from the top down: " they 
don’t spare the budget when it comes to safety […] and this is from, right from the top 
down…” 
Open Safety Leadership. The notion of open safety leadership also emerged from 
the data within the broader theme of engaged safety leadership. Open safety leadership 
included descriptions of communication with management, such as feeling able to and 




management being open to receiving concerns, feedback, and questions. Additionally, 
this included senior management asking questions, resolving disagreements, and sharing 
information about safety statistics and safety-related processes in the organization. One 
participant described that management taking the time to hear employees opinions before 
making a decision demonstrated a commitment to safety: “maybe just listening and like 
not just being stuck on one certain way of doing something. Taking suggestions and 
taking a minute to actually go through different suggestions before taking action....” 
Furthermore, in describing how management could improve their commitment to safety, 
a participant described providing means for following up on a raised safety concern: 
“…if we could see some of that stuff and maybe given a phone number even 
above or whoever is in charge of making the decision, like I’m sure he’s probably 
a ways up the management pole so he doesn’t want a bunch of phone calls from 
all these people but if we had some way of getting in touch with somebody that’s 
involved with the decision and see like what’s their reasons....” 
Respectful leadership. Respectful leadership was a third subtheme of engaged 
safety leadership and is characterized by the perception that management trusts and 
values employees. Participants’ expressed the importance of management’s respect for 
employees in demonstrating commitment. Individuals’ descriptions of respect included 
senior management ensuring that employees receive coaching (e.g., constructive 
feedback) when a mistake is made and that they ensure all management maintain fair and 
realistic expectations (i.e. expectation to complete tasks management would feel 
comfortable completing themselves). A participant described that committed senior 




somebody to do something that they personally wouldn’t do themselves.” As well, one 
participant described his opinion of the organization’s C.E.O, noting the man’s value and 
respect for individuals: 
“every month, yah every month we get a note, [the C.E.O] on email, and it’s his 
own personal writings, he and everyone I’ve talked to that has met him, couldn’t 
ask for a nicer person. And he wants to talk about the person, not talking about the 
job, not talking about what happened yesterday or today, he will maybe at the tail 
end, find out about you, what makes you happy, what’s your life story.”  
4.2 Theme 2: Consistency in Safety Leadership 
 Consistency in safety leadership behaviour was commonly described among 
participants. Participants expressed that leaders who practice what they preach, follow 
through on statements made in response to raised safety concerns, and consistently 
prioritize safety over production reflected senior management’s commitment to safety. 
Moreover, some participants described management consistency (alignment) in 
statements and actions as the strongest indicator of safety commitment. Two subthemes 
emerged from the theme consistency in safety leadership, including: (1) sincere safety 
leadership and (2) unwavering position to work safely. 
Sincere safety leadership. Sincere safety leadership was discussed by a majority 
of participants. Participants described the importance of senior management abiding by 
the principles they are promoting (i.e., practicing what is enforced and promoted). 
Following through on safety concerns was described by one participant when asked how 
his perception of management safety commitment could be improved: : “I guess […] like 




One participant described the importance of sincerity in the promotion and 
wearing of protective equipment: 
“that’s just one example, practicing what they preach, so actually they say they 
value safety and they put in all these rules, following those rules I guess, so if 
they’re visiting a site maybe wearing the equipment that they’re supposed to…” 
Other participants described the example of sincerity in management’s promotion and use 
of protective equipment. In describing a manager committed to safety, one participant 
stated: 
“well like when you’re, say you’re somewhere that needs personal and protective 
equipment, they’re the ones first to have their hard hats on, their safety glasses or 
vests, they’re not getting out of the truck with their crocks on you know and their 
sweaters, or their coffee in their hand saying hey you don’t have your safety 
glasses on right. Someone who’s basically saying you know this is the way it’s 
supposed to be done, this is the example that I’m setting and now you follow, 
that’s what I’d see.” 
Unwavering position to work safely. In the same vein as consistency of leader 
behaviour, maintaining an unwavering position to work safely emerged as an indication 
of safety commitment. Participant descriptions indicated that senior management 
demonstrating an unwavering commitment to safety was a significant indicator of safety 
commitment. For example, one participant recounted how a senior level manager 
enforced safety rules at the cost of production, demonstrating consistency in management 




 “I know he had a courier in Moncton, refused to let him back on the property 
because he was using a cell phone, driving on the road right so my view of him is 
strong.” 
Additionally, a participant stated that a manager who is committed to safety would not 
compromise safety for anything, as described below: 
“I guess they don’t compromise like the situation gets tough, they don’t 
compromise and say o.k. well let’s just do it this one time. It’s always, they put 
their foot down and they say no this isn’t safe we’re not going to do it. […] and I 
think that you need somebody who has the ability to put their foot down and say 
no like this isn’t right, we’re not doing it.” 
4.3 Theme 3. Allocating Money to Safety 
 Participants expressed that allocating finances to safety demonstrated 
managements’ safety values. This included allocating money to maintenance and 
purchasing of equipment, safety programs, and other safety causes. Additionally, some 
participants described that allocating money to safety is the strongest indication of safety 
commitment. In describing senior management operations, several participants stated that 
executive leadership is motivated by financial operations. For example, one participant 
stated: “well a C.E.O, they have a lot to do with the financial aspect of, and income and, 
so that’s their main priority I guess." Similarly, in discussing the level of management in 
control of allocating finances to safety, participants attributed this responsibility to senior 
management: “not at my level and I don’t think so in the higher levels, senior 
management I don’t know. When it comes to safety, they have all the dollars and cents to 




described allocating money to the purchase, inspection, and repair of equipment used 
in daily job tasks. One participant also expressed that allocating finances to safety 
training was a reflection of commitment:  
“a company that was truly committed to safety I think they’d be a little more 
willing to spend the money needed on equipment or tools or training. Training 
especially actually now that I think of it, on how to be safe, on proper procedures 
for things, stuff like that.” 
4.4 Theme 4. Policies and Procedures Reflect a Value for Safety 
 Participants described that senior leader commitment to safety is demonstrated 
through organizational policies and procedures that reflect a value for safety. In this 
context, organizational policies included formal plans implemented by senior 
management that dictate safety related processes in the organization. Procedures are those 
steps required to support and carry out an organizational policy that are enforced by 
senior management. Participants described a variety of policies and procedures 
implemented by management that inform perceptions of a priority for safety. These 
included the implementation of safety rules in response to accidents and injury, requiring 
a formal approval process at the executive level for the implantation of new safety rules, 
individuals having the right to stop work if they feel unsafe, dedicating positions within 
the organization to safety, and the publishing reports and memos related to safety. Two 
subthemes emerged from this overarching theme: (1) management of safety is people 
focused and (2) safety is a priority in policies and procedures. 
Management of safety is people focused. Policies and procedures developed and 




development and enforcement of safety rules with a clear focus on keeping employees 
safe and management of employee behaviour being structured to provide coaching and 
constructive feedback versus punitive action. Participants discussed how organizational 
policies and procedures reflect senior management’s commitment to safety. One example 
was an established policy that allows workers to stop working if they perceive the task to 
be unsafe. One participant explained this policy, but described its limitations in that it is 
only effective for individuals willing to approach their manager and express their 
concern: 
“guys can reject work for sure and they’re aware of that. And if they don’t feel 
safe, they don’t do it and there’s no manager here that will make you do it if you 
don’t feel safe. That’s on a guy who can look at you face to face, you know what I 
mean, he’ll be face to face and say listen I’m not doing that today I don’t feel 
safe...” 
Additionally, participants expressed that senior management’s creation of new rules in 
response to safety events demonstrated a commitment to safety. One participant 
described the generation of new policies in response to accidents and injuries across the 
company: 
“what it seems like if anything happens anywhere in the system, well we have a 
new safety rule. Well somebody got hurt in Calgary and o.k. well we’re going to 
change the safety, this is the way it should be, which I understand.” 
 Similarly, one participant stated that rules within the organization are used to keep 




mean they are good, they’ve got a lot of rules in place because something happened to 
somebody so they make sure it doesn’t happen to anybody else.”  
Safety is a priority in policies and procedures. This subtheme represents 
participant views that policies and procedures reflect a priority for safety. This included 
positions within the organization being dedicated to safety, policies and procedures 
ensuring that changes to safety functioning (e.g., safety rules) within the organization 
require a formal approval process at the executive level, and memos and reports 
published in the company and distributed to employees include a focus on safety. One 
participant described that the extensive approval process involved in creating and 
changing rules demonstrates senior management’s commitment to safety. That is, senior 
management ensures a process is followed in decision-making regarding policies and 
procedures followed at the frontline level: 
"I mean like I said these are the rules, and I know that [the C.E.O is] involved on 
different committees like when there’d be a different procedure or safety rule that 
would come out, that it has to go to him to be approved right, it just can’t be, one 
guy, I can’t just ask a guy o.k. can I do it this way now, it has to be, it has to go 
through the approval committee before we can change a process or procedure, so 
it goes right to the top..." 
Moreover, participants described that memos and reports sent to all members of the 
organization have a focus on safety. However, there was a substantial divide in 
participants’ opinions of reports. A minority stated they read the reports and appreciated 
the information within, while a majority stated they did not read the information nor care 




safety tips were posted regularly, demonstrating management’s focus on safety: 
“they’re always putting up safety tips of the week and stuff like that.”  
4.5 Theme 5. Unengaged Safety Leadership 
 Participant responses also included senior leader behaviour and decision-making 
that inform perceptions of a lack of safety commitment. Participants described that 
experiences of management who are uninvolved in safety matters, fail to speak about 
safety, neglect to ask questions about safety matters, and who fail to ensure lower level 
management engage in safety leadership demonstrate a lack of safety commitment. As 
well, neglect to keep employees informed in the process of responding to safety concerns 
was described as a lack of safety commitment. Participants described feeling personally 
disrespected by management’s lack of compassion and punitive or vengeful behaviour 
inform perceptions of a lack of safety commitment. Three subthemes emerged from the 
data: (1) passive safety leadership, (2) lack of transparency in safety leadership, and (3) 
lack of respectful leadership.  
Passive safety leadership. When discussing senior management who are not 
committed to safety, participants described those who adopted a passive approach to 
safety. This included being uninvolved in safety matters, including not visiting the 
worksite, not speaking with employees about safety, and having a lack of knowledge 
about job tasks and safety policy and procedure. Some participants expressed that 
management’s neglect to ask questions and lack of openness to safety concerns was the 
strongest indication of a lack of safety commitment. When asked to describe a manager 
who is not committed to safety, one participant expressed: “well, total disregard for the 




has seen, does not follow up, with informal or formal investigations. That would be an 
unsafe manager.” As well, there was frequent discussion of a lack of knowledge among 
managers: “I’ve had it happen where you are promoting the safety rules but the people 
that are promoting the rules really didn’t know what the rules were.” Moreover, some 
participants speculated that this paucity in knowledge was a result of a lack in training, as 
described by one participant: 
“well they say they catch the act but they’re observing what we’re doing and 
making judgement calls, safety judgement calls on what we’re doing yet they may 
not be actually trained in the processes that we’re doing so it’s like so why are 
they the ones to say what’s unsafe when they’re not trained in what we’re doing? 
It just doesn’t make sense.” 
As well, one participant discussed that supervisor and middle level management’s actions 
demonstrating a lack of safety commitment were attributable to senior management 
leadership. Participants described that these observations reflected a lack of senior leader 
safety commitment. One participant described senior managements’ inability to lead, as 
lower level management are not implementing senior management’s plans of action: 
"well, it trickles, it has to trickle down to right down through the senior VPs, down to the 
general managers, right down to the [supervisors] right. He can say all he wants as the 
president but he’s not around all these small terminals to see what is underneath him. The 
managers are actually implementing what he says right, and they’re not." 
Lack of transparency in safety leadership. Another trend reflecting a lack of 
safety commitment was a lack of transparency of senior management decision-making, 




described in the context of raised safety concerns. For example, many employees 
discussed requesting new equipment or equipment repairs due to safety concerns, but not 
receiving any feedback from management regarding their request: “it tends to be it’s 
never repaired, we don’t hear anything about it.” One participant recounted the 
frustrations of this experience: 
“well you would think within like a month or so you’d get some sort of indication 
of o.k. we’ve looked into this, we understand what’s going to happen now, it 
might take a little longer but it’s being looked into right instead of just never 
hearing from them again.” 
Similarly, one participant expressed that any feedback regarding a raised concern is 
preferred compared to silence: “I’d rather see that we’re not having the finances, at least 
we have a reason to why it’s not happening. We just don’t hear anything.”  
Lack of respect in safety leadership. Participants often described instances of a 
lack of respect and how this promoted a perception of lack of safety commitment. Many 
participants mentioned that managers adopt a punitive focus and are concerned with 
punishing employees instead of providing constructive feedback to improve everyone’s 
safety. Some employees described this punitive focus as the strongest indication of a lack 
of safety commitment.  As well, participants described issues of vengeful management 
and that the primary concern for all levels of management was not employee well being. 
One participant disclosed how management’s lack of trust and focus on punitive action 
promoted perceptions of a lack of safety commitment: 
“I just don’t have time for their foolishness, them hiding in the woods and doing 




too big of a headache because you’re working out there as an employee and you 
know they’re out there and half the time you don’t want to accumulate demerits 
because you don’t want to get fired because you hire on here and you get a 
mortgage and you’ve got a family to take care of, so you’re more interested in 
looking on the roadway, well where is the [supervisor] sitting today, and you’re 
not paying attention to what you’re doing right, and then you’re running into stuff 
or getting [hurt] or you know your focus is more on not getting demerits and 
where they are compared to your work right.” 
Furthermore, one participant described feeling disrespected when senior management 
would have a lower level manager deliver punitive action: 
“we rarely hear directly from them, like it comes back to like when they’re 
hiding in the bushes watching us work, they’ll be the one to put in the report and 
say that we were doing this unsafe, but they’ll get one of their underlings to 
come out and talk to us later on.” 
As well, in describing a senior manger who is not committed to safety, a participant 
described a manager who expects an employee to complete a task the manager would not 
do him or herself: “…if they asked us to do some work that they wouldn’t do themselves, 
it’s kind of hard to see anyway but it’s easy for them to say one thing and mean another.” 
 Finally, participants described that a lack of compassion when mistake or injury 
was made suggested management did not care for employee safety. One participant 
described the process of injury investigation, highlighting a disregard for employee well-
being: “they want to break everything down to see where you made a mistake, what you 




4.6 Theme 6. Inconsistency in Safety Leadership 
In describing a lack of safety commitment, participants also discussed inconsistent 
and contradictory leader behaviours. Participants described that management who do not 
following through with action in response to statements made about safety improvement 
inform perceptions of a lack of safety commitment. Additionally, management 
prioritizing production over safety was described as an indication of management’s lack 
of safety commitment, characterized by a pressure for employees to complete tasks 
quickly and turning a blind eye to safety noncompliance to ensure the job is completed in 
a shorter time. This theme is characterized by management’s inconsistency and 
contradiction in statements and behaviours, primarily in promoting safety but not 
following through on actions to support this position. Two subthemes emerged from 
inconsistency in safety leadership: (1) insincere safety leadership and (2) value for 
production exceeds value for safety.  
Insincere Safety Leadership. Participants described the negative impact of 
insincere senior manager statements and behaviours. Primarily, participants described 
management’s insincerity in not following through with action when addressing raised 
safety concerns: “they pretty much just tell you what you want to hear at the time, famous 
words: I’ll look into it.” This participant also describes that a manager who is not 
committed to safety is: “basically somebody saying they’re going to do something and 
they don’t do it sort of thing.” Moreover, a participant provided an example of 
management’s false promises or inconsistency in statements and actions:  
"…like I said we had a big meeting when one of the head guys came down and 




and they spew out all these ideas, things they’re going to do and then, and here 
it is six months later and I haven’t seen a single change in anything right.”  
Several other participants stated similar notions, describing their experiences of 
insincerity in management’s statements and behaviours: 
“it comes down to them preaching the safety. If they’re preaching the safety you 
should be able to go to them with a safety concern. It’s just all concerns that we 
come up with, a lot of them are, never seem to be addressed, so. We tell them, but 
there just doesn’t seem to be anything done about it. Some of the little easier 
things, yah they tend to get on to that pretty quick. Some things that take a little 
bit of a commitment on time, manpower, finances, rarely seem to get taken care 
of.” 
Participants also described management’s neglect to lead by example as a 
reflection of a lack of safety commitment. This included management implementing and 
enforcing safety rules but neglecting to abide by these rules. For example, one participant 
described management’s neglect to wear appropriate safety protection when in the 
worksite:  
"…we have to wear safety glasses in our vehicle with the window down. And 
even if our window is down that much, we get taken on statement for not having 
our safety glasses on and at the same time, multiple times, we’ve seen them get on 
[equipment] with no hard hat, no vest on, their regular shoes, and just not taking 
the time to think about us, they should be following the same safety rules…." 
Similarly, another participant described that the strongest indication of a lack of safety 




implements: “…it would probably be like the opposite of what I was saying a leader 
would be you know […] they’re not leading by example, they’re not wearing their 
equipment and stuff like that." 
Value for production exceeds value for safety. In describing a lack of safety 
commitment, a majority of participants described management who would compromise 
safety by prioritizing production. Some participants described this finding as the strongest 
indication of senior management’s lack of commitment. This included senior 
management pressuring employees to increase speed of production and turning a blind 
eye to safety compliance to facilitate this need. One participant described this issue: 
“I know a lot of senior management they like to preach safety but from my 
experiences, they like to preach it until it starts slowing down production. That’s 
when it seems to kind of go out the window and they’re oh don’t worry about that, 
it’s like this is what matters right now type thing.” 
Similarly, this participant described the contradictory nature of management behaviour 
and his feelings of discontent:   
“it’s just hard because you know like in the nature of the job that we have it’s, 
they say oh we’ll never rush you, you know, we’ll never do this stuff and I can 
understand why things happen because we’re a company that tries to move things 
forward quickly and, but they say oh we’ll never rush you but then the next, it’s 
like come on, come on, come on, and I don’t know I just find it’s tough that way.” 
This notion of contradiction in promoting safety but maintaining expectation for hurried 
production was echoed by several other participants: “so I’m not saying it’s all bad right, 




different story.” One participant described his preference for consistency, highlighting 
how inconsistent behaviour can be frustrating and promote scepticism of management’s 
safety commitment: 
“Exactly. It’s like it’s one thing to say safety doesn’t matter, and it’s all about 
production, that’s one thing, but then say safety is the only thing that matters, 
production doesn’t matter, that’s another, but like at least be consistent with what 
you’re doing, like don’t preach one thing and practice the other.” 
Another participant described that senior management turning a blind eye to employees 
working overtime to finish production more quickly would demonstrate a lack of 
commitment: 
“… [if] they were tired and the company or senior management knew that this 
was happening and didn’t stop it, turned a blind eye to it, that would probably be 
something that would concern me in terms of them not being committed to 
safety.” 
4.7 Theme 7. Neglecting to Allocate Resources to Safety 
Participants also described management’s neglect to allocate resources to safety in 
describing what indicates a lack of safety commitment by senior management. 
Participants described that failing to allocate money to ensure appropriate functioning of 
equipment and allocating money for the purchase of small goods in lieu of outstanding 
repairs that compromise safety indicate a lack of safety commitment by senior 
management. Additionally, shutting down safety programs was viewed as a money-
saving task, informing perceptions of a priority for finances over safety. Neglect to 




the safe completion of job tasks. Participants stated that a lack of appropriate staff 
demonstrated management’s priority for production and financial gain over safety, 
thereby demonstrating a lack of safety commitment. Two subthemes emerged in this 
theme: (1) neglecting to allocate money to safety and (2) neglecting to allocate manpower 
to safety. 
Neglecting to allocate money to safety. A neglect to allocate finances to safety 
was discussed as an indication of a lack of safety commitment. Participants described 
management neglecting to allocate money to equipment repairs, purchases, or 
infrastructure repairs and purchases. Moreover, some participants described this finding 
as the strongest indication of senior management’s lack of commitment. One participant 
provided a description of the issue of financial allocation when describing senior 
management’s commitment to safety: 
"…they’re committed to safety to a certain point if it doesn’t cost them money 
[…] things like laying off a lot of people, not repairing machinery that needs 
repair, and they talk about safety and you’re driving vehicles that I’m sure we 
shouldn’t be driving but they want to save money somehow and so it’s always, 
like I said, it’s unbelievable the machinery we’ve had, we’ve got, they’re old, we 
don’t even get new machinery, we got one nice new machinery, I was surprised, 
[…] there’s a lot of machinery there that we shouldn’t, they should be new, 
they’re 50, 60 years old some of them." 
In addition to this, participants described that management failing to meet requests for 
repaired or new equipment and infrastructure, but allocating money to the purchases of 




management allocated resources to the purchase of new stickers to advertise a safety 
campaign while his request to repair equipment went unanswered: 
"…say like we wanted that stuff fixed right, seemed pretty simple, they don’t do it 
and then they go out and buy you know all these little stickers that they put 
everywhere that says you are responsible for your own safety. And I asked like 
how much they paid for it she said like $1000 or something, I said you could have 
used that to fix some lights right. We don’t need stickers everywhere telling us 
what we already know right." 
Furthermore, one participant described that senior management shut down safety 
programs in response to costs incurred from accidents in the field. The participant felt 
that the shutting down of safety programs was used to save money and improve the 
company stock prices, demonstrating a priority for finances over safety: 
“…we’ve had numerous incidents […] in the last year or more and that all costs 
us big dollars, and they recoup any way they can so they shut off this program, 
shut off that program, shut off that program, you have to recoup that money in 
order to keep your stocks going up, my view right but I was never told it was shut 
down because of the budget. That’s my view.” 
Neglecting to allocate manpower to safety. Participants also mentioned allocating 
manpower to safety during interview discussions. Participants described that 
management’s neglect to provide appropriate manpower contributed to accidents and 
injury. One participant recalled how a colleague had injured his shoulder due insufficient 
manpower when completing a job: “these things are reported all the time, and it comes 




things like it should be done, so he hurt his shoulder…” Similarly, a participant 
described that senior management tries to run the organization with as few employees as 
possible, contributing to unsafe working conditions and a perception of a lack of safety 
commitment:  
"they try to run the company with as few employees as they can, as tight a ship as 
they can, so you know they don’t, a lot of times they won’t have any extra men 
around like an incident like that happens...." 
4.8 Theme 8. Policies and Procedures Counteract Safety Prioritization 
 In describing a lack of safety commitment, participants also noted that some 
policies and procedures counteract safety prioritization. This included discrepancies in 
punitive procedure, hiring policies and procedures, and the creation and implementation 
of multiple rules, including rules for some work groups and not others.  
In describing discrepancy in punitive procedure that indicated a lack of 
commitment, one participant explained that coaching letters were distributed when an 
employee was witnessed acting unsafely by a supervisor or middle management. The 
participant stated that coaching letters do not contain any information other than what the 
employee was found to do wrong (i.e., no constructive feedback is included), and 
although coaching letters are promoted as an informal notice, they are attached to an 
employee’s permanent record: 
 “they have these things they call coaching letters, like they’ll give you after they 
spot you doing something unsafe, you’ll get one, although it might be a week 
later, saying that, like you were found doing something unsafe and this is 




at the same time it goes on your permanent record. So they’re saying it’s an 
informal notice but it’s still going on your permanent record….”  
Senior management’s policies and procedures for hiring supervisors were also 
viewed as a reflection of commitment. Participants explained that senior management fail 
to ensure supervisors are knowledgeable and experienced through the hiring and training 
process, reflecting a lack of senior management safety commitment. One participant 
described this experience: 
“I think [the company’s] training for their supervisors and who they hire for their 
supervisors, I don’t think they have enough training to be our supervisor, or I feel 
like there should be something, like you have to like for your driver’s license you 
can’t just get a car and then you can drive, but you have to take a driver’s course 
or you have a period where, that leads up to that where, like they hire supervisors 
a lot here where just right off the street, they have no experience, they don’t, they 
should have at least say like we’re apprentices some of us, and they should be at 
least out of the apprentice stage, working with the company before they become 
supervisors and I think that would make a big difference with safety.”  
Participants also indicated that contradictions in policies and procedures also 
demonstrated that safety was not a priority. For example, one participant described that 
organizational rules differed for different work groups, creating confusing work 
conditions: 
“we have different rules for different people at different places, like I work for 




member] comes in, I can be standing right beside like this [...] if I don’t have 
my hard hat on I’m in trouble. You’re not required to wear one.” 
4.9 Authenticity 
 In the interviews participants were also asked to describe how they could tell if 
senior management are authentic in their promotion of safety commitment. Statements 
included senior management who: follow through on statements that are made, visit the 
worksite and speak with frontline employees, provide detailed feedback to employees on 
how they are working, are knowledgeable in safety protocol and procedure, are open to 
ideas and feedback from employees, expect employees to complete tasks they would feel 
safe to complete themselves, reward safety compliance, and who consistently prioritize 
safety over production.   
 One participant described that authenticity was a reflection of knowledge, 
particularly in asking questions when one is not knowledgeable, as well as taking the 
initiative to speak up when an unsafe act is witnessed: 
“a prime example right now is my assistant […] supervisor, […] she used to run 
her own, she used to have her own company, private company […] and when she 
got into the […] industry she had no clue. But now she’s picked my brain apart 
every day for the last five years […] she’s picked other supervisors, other 
foremen, and passed supervisor branch apart, she’s a good supervisor. She’s really 
authentic when it comes to safety and promotes it. If she sees something wrong, 
she’s not afraid to give a friendly blast to the boys you know, stop right now, you 




Additionally, one participant described that management maintaining fair and realistic 
expectations for work reflects authentic safety commitment. The participant described 
how unfair expectations are made transparent through a pressure for production: 
“…actually seeing them get in there and do that, our type of work, you would 
never see it but at the same time, if they asked us to do some work that they 
wouldn’t do themselves, it’s kind of hard to see anyway but it’s easy for them to 
say one thing and mean another. It’s like oh yah we don’t want you to do that 
work, it’s unsafe but really they’re pushing the productivity envelope so much 
that it’s like there’s no other way for it to happen. If you want productivity, you’re 
asking us to do this unsafely. So that’s definitely upper management type thing, 
not our direct supervisor.” 
 The existence or lack of a relationship was also described by participants in 
discussions of manager authenticity. Many individuals described the importance of 
having a relationship with a person to determine authentic behaviour. One participant 
described that authenticity can best be determined by having a relationship with an 
individual and experiences and discussions with that person. In reflecting on his 
supervisor’s authenticity, the participant stated “Well I know my supervisor fairly well, 
you can hear it in his voice. […] You can see there’s concern on his face.” A participant 
described a similar notion by referring to the importance of time in determining 
authenticity: “how do you learn to trust somebody? Just by, over time and they don’t lie 
to you and they’re straight up with you....” In discussing authentic safety commitment of 




inability to determine authenticity of senior management due to a lack of relationship, 
as described by one participant:  
“you know once in a while he’ll send a letter out that you know we’re committed 
to safety and we want to do better and stuff like that, and you’re thinking o.k. 
maybe he’s serious but then you’re thinking, the guy’s just a picture you know, 
you never see him so you don’t know if he’s there for, you know he’s there for the 
money but is he committed to this or he’s just blowing wind here.” 
For other participants, although a relationship did not exist, inferences about senior 
management’s authenticity were made through indirect sources (newsletters, magazine 
articles, media interviews, information from others). One participant inferred authenticity 
from experience observing the C.E.O speak in the press and reading about the individual 
in the newspaper: "well he sounds like he’s really, like I say he’s genuine, he sounds like 
he’s a real person. He doesn’t talk or sound like an executive, he’d probably be the guy 
sitting next to you at lunch." 
 Lack of authenticity was described as senior management who are inconsistent in 
behaviour, including not leading by example and management who enforce safety rules 
for some employees but turn a blind eye when other employees make an infraction. Lack 
of authenticity was also described as management who: are not open to suggestions or 
feedback from employees, do not follow through on statements made regarding safety 
concerns, and express a value for production over safety. One participant described the 
C.E.O’s unauthentic safety commitment as promotion of safety in newsletters and memos 
but neglect to ensure all levels of management enforce safety policies and procedures: 




don’t believe [he is authentic in his commitment to safety], no.” Similarly other 
participants described that senior management’s pressure for production contradicted 
promotion of safety, reflecting unauthentic leadership. One participant stated: “they talk 
about safety and they turn around and talk about production.” Another participant stated: 
“…senior management I would say they’ve got to believe in it, they’re pushing it, 
pushing it, pushing it but when it comes to the bottom line, I don’t see it. You 
know it’s going to get spoken to you about and talked about and everything but 
productivity seems to be a little more in the forefront right getting it done. Not 
telling you to do it the wrong way, but shitting on you when you don’t get it done 
right…” 
4.10 Direct Message Sources 
Results demonstrated that senior manager decisions and behaviours are direct 
information sources that signal management’s value for safety. Participants described a 
variety of visible outcomes attributable to management decision-making that demonstrate 
safety commitment. Decisions were inferred from observing the implementation of 
policies and procedures focused on employee safety, the allocation of money to safety, 
and the prioritization of safety over production. These signals were described as senior 
management decisions regarding production of safety rules in response to safety 
incidents, allocating money to equipment or infrastructure, and suspending production 
due to unsafe conditions. Senior manager behaviours demonstrating safety commitment 
included visiting the worksite, speaking with employees about safety, and 




management visiting the worksite, speaking about safety with employees, and 
providing detailed feedback on the status of safety issues, reflected safety commitment.  
 A lack of safety commitment was also demonstrated by senior leader decision-
making or behaviour. Neglecting to allocate money to safety, pressure for production 
over safety, a lack of feedback regarding safety concerns, and safety rules that do not 
reflect a value for safety, were inferred by participants as management decisions and 
described as a lack of safety commitment. Behaviours demonstrating a lack of safety 
commitment included lack of safety knowledge and not leading by example. Appendix H 
provides a complete list of source characteristics for leader decisions and behaviours. 
In some instances, codes derived from the data were attributed to both leader 
decisions and behaviours. These included rewarding safety compliance, enforcing safety 
rules, sharing information about safety statistics and safety related organizational 
processes, safety knowledge, and turning a blind eye. For example, rewarding safety 
compliance was described by one participant as an example of senior management 
decision-making, demonstrated through the annual receiving of a safety bonus. A 
different participant described senior management’s verbal praise for safety compliance 
during a site visit as a reflection of safety commitment. Similarly, participants described 
sharing information about safety statistics and safety related organizational processes as 
examples of senior management’s decisions and behaviours. One participant stated that at 
senior management’s presentation of safety statistics at an annual safety meeting 
demonstrates commitment to safety. Another participant described that receiving printed 
information about the cause of accidents was attributable to senior management decision-




management’s decision to implement new tools and equipment. One participant 
expressed that providing new tools and equipment needed to complete tasks safely 
demonstrated senior management’s knowledge of work tasks. A different participant 
described that commitment to safety was reflected in a senior manager who is able to 
verbalize the rule of the day when visiting the jobsite, subsequently demonstrating a 
knowledge for safety policies and procedures. Finally, turning a blind eye was also 
described as information attributed to senior management’s decisions and behaviours. 
One participant described that pressure from senior management to complete work 
quickly despite increased risk demonstrated decisions reflecting a lack of commitment. A 
different participant described that lack of safety commitment is reflected in senior 
management who ignore safety infractions when visiting the worksite. Description of the 
relevance of these findings is included in the discussion section.   
4.11 Indirect Message Sources and Message Characteristics 
In addition to signals of safety commitment from management’s decision-making 
and behaviours, signals of safety commitment were identified as being perceived from 
indirect sources. These sources included information in printed or televised mediums, 
stories from colleagues, family, or lower level management, and overheard information 
exchanged between senior management and lower level managers at the worksite. Signals 
of commitment were also inferred through employees experience at the worksite, 
including supervisor and middle management’s leadership practices. Participants 
discussed that supervisor and middle level management’s actions demonstrating safety 
commitment or a lack of safety commitment, were attributable to senior management’s 




engage in safety leadership behaviours were said to reflect senior management’s lack 
of leadership behaviour. 
Descriptive characteristics of messages were also described by participants and 
included: written information published for all employees at the organization (e.g. 
newsletters, memos), written information published for the individual (e.g. coaching 
letter), verbal information given in person, verbal information given over the phone, 
indirect information (information mixed in with an abundance of additional information), 
and direct information (information that is clear and focused only on safety). A detailed 
summary of indirect message sources and quality characteristics is provided in Appendix 
I). 
4.12 Sender and Receiver Characteristics 
Similar to the descriptions of message characteristics, participants described 
characteristics related to the message sender. Participants described a number of 
attributes reflecting a senior manager who is convincing in his or her promotion of safety 
commitment, including an individual perceived to be: trustworthy, confident, 
professional, friendly, strong in public speaking, happy, honest, credible, engaged, smart, 
respectful, reliable, open, and an individual who takes responsibility. Contrarily, 
participants described attributes that promoted a senior manager as not committed to 
safety, including: bull-shitter, insecure, unengaged, lack of knowledge, disrespectful, lack 
of compassion, arrogant, and someone who fails to take responsibility.   
 With respect to receiver characteristics, participant descriptions indicated that 
their motivation or ability impacted how signals of senior management safety 




information that was specific to their job made them more inclined to read the 
information. For example, one participant described that messages that are relevant are 
helpful:  
“…usually, I skim through them, most of it doesn’t really relate to what I do, but 
you know the odd one does, like if somebody gets hurt they send out a notice that 
says you know somebody went and lost their thumb and you think oh geez right, 
it happened right and you say o.k. and the next time you’re in that situation then 
well geez now I understand how that other guy did it, so I’ll make sure I don’t 
right, so stuff like that does help.” 
Adding to this notion, one participant described a letter sent at least once per month by 
the organization’s C.E.O, describing his opinion of the content: “…it’s just like 
community stuff they’re doing somewhere else, nothing’s ever around here, it’s always in 
Brampton, out west and it’s just stuff like that, photo opportunities…” 
 Participants also described their ability to receive messages. For example, one 
participant described his experience of senior management visiting the worksite, 
indicating that an individual’s focus changes and enhanced self-monitoring is applied to 
ensure mistakes are not made:  
"if they’re there, now you got everybody nervous, you know they’re watching and 
you know what they’re watching for and o.k. everything is closed down, 
everybody watches themselves, so you’re obvious, you can see them so it scars 
everybody right there and hopefully they don’t make a mistake in front of them." 
A small number of participants described that there is an abundance of newsletters 




utilize the information. Many participants expressed that information in newsletters 
and printed media addressed to all employees in the organization could not be trusted. 
Some participants referred to these articles as propaganda  
“I don’t believe everything I hear that’s for sure, right, you know what I mean so 
but as far as dealing with them, well you have no dealings with them, you read the 
propaganda they give you, and I do anyway, a lot of people just delete or throw it 
away…”   
One participant described that when information is not relevant he and others are not 
inclined to read it: “…people don’t care or pay attention. Propaganda. Most doesn’t 
pertain to what I do. If something happens they send out a notice. That stuff does help.” 
Appendix J provides a detailed summary of sender and receiver characteristics described 
by participants. 
4.13 Summary of Results. 
 In summary, participants described a range of management behaviours that 
indicate safety commitment and a lack of safety commitment. In the context of senior 
managers, descriptions included behaviours and decision-making regarding safety as well 
as how management regulate or fail to regulate the behaviours and decision-making of 
lower level managers. 
Active, open, and respectful leadership behaviours in the context of safety 
management were discussed by a majority of participants. Participants described that 
consistencies in leader statements and actions provided a strong message of safety 
commitment. This included ensuring consistency in all levels of management functioning 




lack of safety commitment, participants described management who promoted safety 
but prioritized production or made promises to look into safety concerns but provided no 
follow up. Moreover, allocating money to safety and ensuring policies and procedures 
demonstrate a priority for safety were included as descriptions of senior management’s 
safety commitment, while failure to allocate money or ensure policies and procedures 
promote a priority for safety was discussed as a reflection of a lack of commitment. 
 Within the context of policies and procedures reflecting a priority for safety, it is 
important to note that mixed results were found regarding the creation and 
implementation of new rules following safety incidents. A majority of participants 
described that rules were a reflection of safety commitment, however, a minority of 
employees described that the number of rules made it difficult to complete tasks 
successfully. Some participants described that at times rules differed depending on work 
group membership, creating confusion.  
 In discussions of management authenticity, authentic managers were described as 
those who followed through on statements that were made, visited the worksite and spoke 
with employees, ensured transparency by providing feedback, were knowledgeable about 
safety, open to employee concerns and feedback, and maintained fair expectations, and 
who consistently prioritized production over safety. Contrarily, manager’s not authentic 
in their safety commitment were described as individuals who were not open to feedback 
or concerns from employees, inconsistent in leadership behaviour, do not follow through 
on statements made in response to safety concerns, and who demonstrate a value for 




Participants also described message medium and quality, as well as sender and 
receiver characteristics. Messages were identified from numerous sources in the work 
environment, including verbal information from individuals, information inferred from 
observing the disposition and experience of others, overheard verbal exchanges, and 
information from changes or lack of change experienced in the work site. Moreover, 
employees described specific aspects of the message sender, such as personality, 
appearance, demeanour, and degree of relationship between receiver and sender. 
Regarding message content, participants described a variety of message characteristics, 
including messages written for many versus written for an individual, verbal information 
(in person or telephone), online video information, and safety information combined with 
other information (indirect) versus safety information the only information in a message 
(direct). 
 Finally, participants’ responses were analyzed to determine receiver 
characteristics that impact message interpretation. Nervousness, faith in accuracy of the 
message source, information relevance, and general view of the information were 
identified. In sum, the results of this study identified individual components of the 
conceptual framework and support the proposed process of perception formation. These 
findings and their implications are discussed in detail in the next section. 




Section 5: Discussion 
5.1 Purpose of research 
 The purpose of this research was to provide an understanding of how employees 
perceive senior manager safety commitment. This includes understanding what aspects of 
senior management behaviour and decision-making influence employee perceptions and 
how employees discern authenticity of commitment. Furthermore, this study aimed to 
identify antecedents of information route processing that inform perceptions of senior 
management’s safety commitment. The findings from this study contribute to greater 
knowledge of organizational safety functioning and provide a deeper understanding of 
employee perceptions as they relate to manager safety commitment.  
5.2 Discussion of Research Questions   
5.2.1 What does senior manager safety commitment look like to employees?  
The results from this investigation demonstrated that perceptions of senior 
manager commitment to safety are formed through direct and indirect employee 
experiences. That is, employees make inferences about senior manager safety 
commitment from direct interaction with senior management and through indirect 
messages from a variety of mediums. In short, resulting themes suggest that employees 
form perceptions from senior managements’ engagement in safety leadership, 
consistency in safety leadership, allocation of resources to safety, and development and 
implementation of safety related policies and procedures. Senior leaders demonstrate 
these signals of commitment through observable behaviours (e.g., visiting the worksite) 




safety rules). Signals of senior leader commitment are also inferred through indirect 
sources, such as supervisor and lower level management’s leadership practices. In this 
context, participants form perceptions of senior management’s commitment through 
senior leader’s management of direct reports and associated subordinates.  
 Overall, employees perceived senior management commitment as management’s 
personal involvement in safety matters at the worksite, openness to communicating with 
employees and receiving feedback, and expression of respect and value for employees. 
These aspects of engaged safety leadership suggest that employees perceive 
individualized recognition as an indication of senior leader safety commitment. In 
essence, management who visit the worksite more than once per year, interact with 
employees about safety in a constructive manner, and make informed decisions based on 
these experiences demonstrate a value for individuals’ safety. Additionally, some 
employees perceived lower level management’s leadership behaviour as a result of senior 
management leadership. Supervisor and middle level management’s leadership was 
described as a reflection of senior management’s decision-making and priority for safety. 
This finding suggests that supervisor and lower level management play an important role 
in shaping employee perceptions of senior management leadership behaviour and safety 
commitment. Thus, lower level management’s leadership behaviours should be 
considered when investigating perceptions of senior leader safety commitment. 
 Similarly, employees perceived senior management commitment as a reflection of 
policies and procedures centered on the safety of people, indicated by senior management 
implementing safety rules, enforcing coaching and constructive feedback versus punitive 




Some participants viewed memos and reports focused on safety as a reflection of 
senior management’s safety commitment, however, the success of this signal depended 
on message relevance and individuals’ attitudes toward the published document. 
Participants who found published reports irrelevant or negative did not view the material 
as a reflection of commitment. Allocating money to safety was often expressed as 
reflection of commitment. Allocating finances to safety indicates a cost inferred by senior 
management and thus, a priority for individuals’ safety above financial gain. Finally, 
participants mentioned consistency in safety leadership as an indication of commitment. 
Results demonstrated that senior management who ensure all management lead by 
example, follow through on statements made in response to employee safety concerns, 
and maintain a priority for safety over production influence perceptions of safety 
commitment.   
Aligning Results with Influence Tactics. The aforementioned findings are 
consistent with literature on leader influence tactics. The theme of engaged safety 
leadership is characterized by active, open, and respectful leadership, constructs closely 
aligned with soft influence tactics (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985). In describing senior 
management safety commitment, individuals most often described influencing 
mechanisms centered on promotion of care and value for the employee, including 
openness and communication, consistency in prioritizing employee safety, and ensuring 
policies and procedures prioritize employee safety.  
A more recent study investigating influence tactics and safety found that the soft 
influence tactic consultation (employees involved in the decision-making process) and 




individually influenced safety participation, with safety climate partially mediating 
these relationships (Clarke & Ward, 2006). These findings closely align with the present 
study, suggesting that senior management’s efforts to enhance transparency and use 
knowledge of worksite functioning to inform decision-making are important in promoting 
perceptions of commitment. Clarke and Ward (2006) also found that the soft influence 
tactic inspirational appeals (using emotional language to emphasise task importance and 
arouse enthusiasm) was found to influence safety participation, a relationship fully 
mediated by safety climate. Again, this notion was supported by participant descriptions 
of the importance of active safety leadership, including senior management visiting the 
worksite and discussing safety matters. Although participants did not supply descriptions 
of management using emotional language, participants described the importance of senior 
management discussing safety matters with frontline workers, providing some support for 
this notion.  
Aligning Results with Leadership Literature. Investigations of the positive 
impact of transformational leadership and contingent reward on safety outcomes has 
found safety climate as a mediating factor. Zohar (2002) found an association between 
active leadership (including transformational leadership and contingent reward 
behaviours), improved safety climate, and fewer injuries. Kelloway, Mullens, and Francis 
(2006) determined similar findings, identifying a significant relationship between safety-
specific transformational leadership behaviour on safety consciousness, a relationship 
mediated by safety climate. Clarke’s (2013) meta-analysis provides further support of the 
impact of general transformational leadership behaviours on safety outcomes, 




and transactional leadership behaviours on employee safety, relationships mediated by 
safety climate.  
The present study aids in better understanding these findings, demonstrating the 
specific behaviours employees perceive as reflections of safety commitment. For 
example, engaged safety leadership encompasses leadership qualities consistent with 
transformational leadership’s individualized consideration (management demonstrating 
value and concern for employees; Avolio & Bass, 2002). The findings that senior 
management who lead by example and maintain an unwavering position to work safely 
demonstrate safety commitment describe transformational leadership’s idealised 
influence (inspiring others to follow by acting as a role model; Avolio & Bass, 2002). 
Support was also found for transformational leadership’s intellectual stimulation 
(challenging followers to be innovative and creative; Avolio & Bass, 2002). Barling, et 
al. (2002) described that in the context of safety practice, leaders use intellectual 
stimulation to “…encourage their employees to address occupational safety issues and 
enhance information sharing about occupational safety and risks” (p. 489). Participant 
descriptions of open safety leadership included management being open to feedback or 
safety concerns and asking questions about safety functioning.  These behaviours likely 
promote discussion of occupational safety issues and safety risks, thereby demonstrating 
idealized influence.  
Interestingly, support for transformational leadership’s inspirational motivation 
(inspiring and motivating followers; Avolio & Bass, 2002) was limited. The present 
study’s findings of active safety leadership and respectful leadership (two subthemes of 




constitutes talking to frontline employees about safety and providing employees with 
constructive feedback, whereas respectful leadership describes management’s 
demonstration of value and care for employees. These characteristics may inspire 
employee value for safety, particularly through coaching (encouragement and detailed 
constructive feedback). Avolio and Bass (2002) describe that in the context of 
occupational safety, inspirational motivation involves “…challeng[ing] subordinates to 
go beyond their individual needs for the collective good. [Leaders] do so by convincing 
their followers that they can achieve safety levels previously believed to be unattainable, 
using symbols and stories to clarify their mission” (p. 489). Although participants 
described promotion of safety through stories in newsletters published by management, 
some participants found this information to be useless and lack relevance. As well, some 
participants regarded this information as propaganda, thought to be used by management 
to influence positive perceptions. Other participants perceived written information to be a 
valid portrayal of management beliefs and values, suggesting that these individuals may 
infer inspirational motivation behaviours through published documents. Greater 
investigation is needed to understand if employee perceptions of senior management’s 
safety commitment include acts of inspirational motivation. 
The findings in this study also support literature in ethical leadership. Described 
as honest and open individuals who maintain integrity (Walumbwa et al., 2008) this 
leadership style involves a transactional focus on moral management (reward and 
discipline). Thus, the findings in this study describing leader attributes of honesty and 




others enforce safety rules reflects commitment, suggest that ethical leadership and 
transactional leadership qualities are important in promoting safety commitment. 
 Aligning Results with Senior Management Literature. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Flin (2003) surmised that senior management portray safety commitment 
through their management of resources, particularly time, money, and people. Similarly, 
Zohar (2014) proposed that senior managers influence perceptions of safety commitment 
through hazard control and risk management. The present findings echo these 
speculations, and provide greater insight into management behaviours. Management of 
time as an indication of safety commitment describes many of the findings in the present 
study. Allocating time to safety is supported to be perceived by employees as senior 
management’s engagement in safety at worksites, ensuring all levels of management are 
transparent about decision-making and actions, ensuring consistency in managements 
statements and actions, and developing policies and procedures that reflect a value for 
safety. Similar to Flin (2003), allocating money to safety was identified as theme from 
participant descriptions, and is supported to be an important factor influencing 
perceptions of commitment. Finally, Flin’s (2003) speculation that allocating manpower 
to safety influences perceptions of senior manager safety commitment was not directly 
identified in the present investigation. Support for this notion exists however, as 
participants described a neglect to allocate manpower to safety as an indication of a lack 
of safety commitment, suggesting the alternative would assert a positive influence. More 
investigation is needed in this area to determine the impact of manpower on employee 
perceptions of senior leader safety commitment. 




(2014b), this research provides preliminary insight regarding alignment of employee 
and senior manager perceptions of safety commitment. As discussed in the literature 
review, Fruhen and colleagues’ (2014b) investigated the personal attributes perceived to 
impact safety management. The authors surveyed senior managers and found that social 
competence and interpersonal leadership skills were described as attributes central to the 
demonstration of safety commitment. In the present study, consistent results were found. 
Participants described management communicating about safety, listening to participants 
concerns and feedback, and demonstrating a value for employees as indications of safety 
commitment, behaviours reflecting social competence and interpersonal skills. Similarly, 
Fruhen et al.’s (2014b) finding that perceptions of safety commitment are impacted by 
leader personality was similar to findings in the present study. Participants in the present 
study described leader attributes that influence perceptions of authenticity, including 
open/approachable, fair, reliable, and respectful (see section 5.2.3 for discussion of 
attributes). Moreover, the present study’s themes representing safety commitment 
provided evidence consistent with Fruhen et al.’s (2014b) findings that safety knowledge 
and problem-solving demonstrate safety commitment. Employees and senior managers 
perceived senior managements’ knowledge of safety policies and procedures, inquiry to 
find out first hand knowledge of functioning at the worksite, and informed and 
transparent decision-making as reflections of commitment. Interestingly, Fruhen and 
colleagues (2014b) identified balanced allocation of finances to safety as a characteristic 
of senior management problem-solving. Similarly, the present study found that allocation 
of finances to safety was a reflection of safety commitment, however, individuals noted 




Further investigation is necessary to determine alignment between these perceptions, as 
management’s balancing of finances may reflect a neglect of resource allocation to 
employees, promoting negative perceptions.  
Finally, Fruhen et al. (2014b) found mixed results regarding the motivational trait 
regulatory focus. Regulatory focus is a form of self-regulation whereby individuals are 
motivated to accomplish goals using prevention or promotion strategies (Higgins, 1997). 
Prevention strategies involve motivation guided by security, safety, and responsibility, 
whereas promotion strategies include motivation guided by advancement, growth, and 
accomplishment (Higgins, 1997). In the context of organizational safety, Fruhen at al. 
(2014b) suggest that prevention-focused motivation is characterized by an avoidance of 
negative outcomes and a focus on safety that can be indicated by avoidance of risk. 
Comparatively, the authors characterize promotion-focused motivation by a desire for 
accomplishments and gains that can be indicated by prioritization of issues. Interestingly, 
Fruhen at al.’s (2014b) study found that manager’s provide descriptions of both 
prevention and promotion strategies when identifying attributes of senior manager safety 
commitment. Although it is not possible for employees to identify the motivation strategy 
behind management’s actions, theoretical evidence suggests that these strategies play a 
role in shaping management behaviour and decision-making, therefore impacting 
follower perceptions and behaviours (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007). Fruhen et al. (2014b) 
speculate that managers may engage in both strategies to balance caution while 
completing a number of tasks in a timely manner. Results from the present study support 
this notion, as employees’ perceptions of management’s mitigation of risk (e.g., 




concerns paired with allocation of resources demonstrate that management’s use of 
both strategies can aid in sending a strong signal of safety commitment. More 
investigation is needed in this area to better understand the role of regulatory focus on 
management behaviour and perceptions of safety commitment.     
 It is important to note that the aforementioned research on senior leader safety 
commitment (i.e., Flin, 2003; Fruhen et al., 2014b; Zohar 2014) attempted to identify 
behaviours that influence perceptions of commitment, however, behaviours influencing a 
lack of commitment were mostly absent from discussion. Results from the present study 
indicated that behaviours influencing a lack of commitment (unengaged safety leadership, 
inconsistency in safety leadership, neglecting to allocate resources to safety, and policies 
and procedures that counteract safety prioritization) have a powerful impact on employee 
perceptions, signifying the importance of research in this area.  
5.2.2 What management behaviours reflect a lack of safety commitment?  
Perceptions of senior management’s lack of safety commitment appeared largely 
as an absence of safety commitment behaviours. For example, unengaged safety 
leadership emerged as a theme in the data, represented by passive or uninvolved safety 
leadership, a neglect to provide feedback to employees to keep them informed of 
management decision-making and action, and a lack of respect in safety leadership. 
Unengaged safety leadership was also represented by senior management’s neglect to 
ensure lower level management implemented senior management’s plans of action. These 
findings add further support to the notion that active safety leadership characterized by 
senior leadership who are present and involved at the frontline level are important in 




lower level management practices influence perceptions of senior management 
leadership, highlighting the importance of considering these factors when investigating 
perceptions of senior leader safety commitment.   
Furthermore, inconsistency in safety leadership, including not leading by example 
and prioritizing production over safety, neglecting to allocate money to resources and 
neglecting to allocate manpower for safe completion of work tasks, and enforcing 
policies and procedures that impede employees’ ability to act safely were described by 
participants as indicators of a lack of safety commitment.  
 Aligning Results with Leadership Literature. These findings are consistent 
with previous literature surrounding poor leadership, characterized by passive and 
abusive leadership behaviours (Kelloway, Sivanathan, Francis, Barling, 2005). Kelloway 
and colleagues (2005) contend that passive leadership is characterized by a lack of 
voluntary intervention, or intervention only when absolutely necessary, and avoidance of 
decision-making and role responsibilities. Empirical investigations have established a 
connection between passive leadership and negative safety outcomes. Zohar’s (2002) 
findings included passive leadership negatively impacting safety climate, consequently 
contributing to greater injury rates. Similarly, Kelloway at al.’s (2006) investigation 
found that safety-specific passive leadership behaviour contributed to poorer safety 
climate and in turn, higher incidence of injury. These characteristics align with the 
present study whereby employees descriptions of managements’ lack of safety 
commitment included passive acts, such as not visiting the worksite, not discussing safety 




Moreover, Kelloway and colleagues (2005) described abusive leadership as 
“[engagement] in aggressive or punitive behaviors toward […] employees” (p. 91). In the 
present study, reports by participants described a lack of safety commitment as 
disrespectful leadership, including senior management enforcing a punitive focus while 
failing to provide constructive feedback, senior management allowing or practicing 
vengeful management behaviour, and senior management allowing or maintaining a lack 
of manager trust in employee operations. Thus, it is suggested that abusive leadership 
contributes to perceptions of a lack of safety commitment, although this finding has yet to 
be supported experimentally.  
The present findings regarding inconsistency in safety leadership behaviour 
reflecting a lack of safety commitment are also supported by previous literature. Mullen, 
Kelloway, and Teed (2011) defined inconsistent leadership as the interaction of passive 
and safety-specific transformational leadership, whereby leaders engage in these 
leadership behaviours at different frequencies. The authors found that passive leadership 
behaviour attenuated positive outcomes (greater safety compliance and safety 
participation) from transformational leadership behaviour. Combined with Mullen et al.’s 
(2011) findings, the results from the present study highlight the importance of 
consistency in management’s safety leadership. 
5.2.3 How do employees discern if management are authentic in their safety 
commitment behaviour?   
In the present study, participants described discerning managements’ authenticity 
of safety commitment through their experience of management actions, including visits to 




are working, openness to receiving ideas and feedback from employees, demonstration 
of knowledge for safety protocol and procedure, following through on statements made, 
maintenance of fair and realistic expectations, rewarding of safety compliance, and 
prioritization of safety over production. These descriptions of leader behaviours reflect 
personal characteristics of compassion, trustworthiness, and honesty, characteristics 
previously highlighted in authentic leadership literature (Avolio & Gardner, 2005). 
Moreover, descriptions of the impact of having a relationship with senior management 
combined with the aforementioned characteristics suggest that authenticity is best 
determined through managements’ personal interaction with employees. As well, results 
suggest that it is the consistent engagement in this behaviour across time and context that 
promotes authentic commitment. This notion is best supported through participants’ 
descriptions of unauthentic leader behaviour. Descriptions included inconsistency in 
management behaviour, particularly not leading by example, and turning a blind eye to 
safety noncompliance. Not following through on statements made, not being open to 
suggestions or feedback from employees, not having a relationship with employees (i.e., 
never having met employees) and prioritizing production over safety were also described 
as factors that promote the perception of unauthentic leaders. These behaviours directly 
oppose the characteristics described in authentic leadership, such as maintaining a high 
moral character and being aware of the context in which one operates (Avolio & Gardner, 
2005).  
 In addition to the management behaviours, a variety of leader attributes were 
described as having an impact on participant’s perceptions of authentic safety 




confidence, friendliness, happiness, intelligence, reliability, and credibility were a few 
of the attributes described as influencing positive perceptions of safety commitment (see 
Sender Characteristics in Appendix J for a full list of attributes). Perceptions of leader 
attributes varied across participants and were inferred through a number of different 
mediums. When describing the senior leader of the organization, attributes were inferred 
from the manager’s emotional disposition (e.g., facial expression, tone of voice), content 
in writings completed by the manager (e.g., style of writing), publications highlighting 
manager philanthropy (e.g., photos and stories about volunteering), news stories about the 
manager’s involvement in the industry, and information about the manager described by 
colleagues, other management, or friends and family. Leader attributes reflecting a lack 
of safety commitment were also described by participants and included arrogance, 
unintelligence, someone who is disrespectful, someone who lacks compassion, an 
individual who is a poor communicator, who is unreliable, and someone who fails to take 
responsibility. These results are consistent with previous literature that has shown an 
impact of leader attributes on perception (e.g., Trumbo & McComas, 2003; Chaiken & 
Eagly, 1983). Moreover, consistent with models of signaling and information processing, 
this study supports that a combination of leader attributes and behaviours impact 
perception formation. As well, the variance in participant responses regarding 
discernment of authenticity suggests that individual (i.e., receiver) characteristics 
contribute to this process. More on this in section 5.2.6.    
5.2.4 What management behaviour most strongly signals safety commitment? 
 In discussing the management behaviours that signal the strongest commitment to 




frontline level by visiting the worksite and discussing safety with employees. Others 
discussed senior management who are consistent in their statements and actions 
prioritizing safety, such as promoting and use of protective equipment, and following 
through on statements that are made. Others mentioned that the strongest indication of 
safety commitment was allocating money to safety by purchasing new equipment, 
equipment repairs, and ensuring equipment was inspected annually. These results suggest 
that the most convincing or strongest indication of manager safety commitment varies 
among individuals. That is, no single management behaviour or decision emerged that 
reflected a position of commitment above all others. Depending on participant experience 
and preference, specific behaviours are more indicative of safety commitment than 
others.  
Consistent among perceptions however, is that value for safety is perceived as 
safety-related costs incurred by senior management. For example, the aforementioned 
behaviours demonstrated senior leaders promoting a value for individuals’ safety by 
visiting the worksite, discussing safety with employees, and promoting safety), costing 
senior managers their time. Moreover, allocating money to safety (purchasing equipment, 
equipment repairs, and inspections) reflects a financial cost incurred by senior 
management. It is likely that the perceived consistency of behaviour indicating safety 
commitment reflects a series of costs (time and money) over an extended period. These 
findings are aligned with Flin’s (2003) notion that senior managers indicate value for 
safety through allocation of time, followed by money. Results from the present study did 




however, the frequency of statements suggests management’s time has a greater impact 
on employee perceptions.  
5.2.5 What management behaviour most strongly signals a lack of safety 
commitment? 
Similar to the findings of strongest commitment behaviour, in discussing what 
indicates the strongest lack of safety commitment, participants mentioned neglecting to 
allocate money to safety, prioritizing production over the safety of employees, not 
leading by example, using punitive action in lieu of constructive feedback, and having 
poor communication with employees. Again, no single behaviour emerged as the 
strongest indication of a lack of safety commitment, however, these results further 
support the finding that management incurring safety-related costs signals priority for 
safety. Management neglecting to incur cost for the purposes of safety demonstrates a 
lack of safety commitment. Again, costs align with notions of senior management safety 
commitment demonstrated through allocation of time and money (Flin, 2003). 
Interestingly, neglecting to allocate money to safety arose as the most frequent indication 
of a lack of safety commitment, however, more investigation is needed to determine the 
order of neglected costs that most strongly indicate a lack of safety commitment.  
Interestingly, allocating manpower to safety (Flin, 2003) was not described by 
participants when discussing perceptions of the greatest indicator of senior managements’ 
safety commitment or neglect for safety. Support for this notion was garnered through 
participant’s general discussion of senior leader safety commitment, with descriptions 




commitment. More investigation is needed to determine the impact of allocating 
manpower to safety on employee perceptions.    
5.2.6 What characteristics of route processing antecedents influence perception 
formation? 
 As previously mentioned, a variety of leader characteristics are suggested to 
impact perceptions of senior managements’ authentic safety commitment. In combination 
with this, results indicate that characteristics of the message and receiver impact message 
interpretation.  
 Results from the present study suggest that high quality (strong, persuasive, and 
valid) messages of safety commitment are those that promote an unfaltering message of 
commitment. Findings imply that messages of highest quality are those that instil the 
perception that management value employees as individuals and prioritize safety above 
all else, particularly production and other financial obligations in the organization. As 
mentioned, value for safety is reflected through management incurring safety-related 
costs related to time (e.g., visiting the worksite and discussing safety with employees) 
and money (e.g., purchasing equipment or equipment repairs). Importantly, this 
prioritization appears to be high quality only if practiced consistently. Findings indicated 
that inconsistency in prioritization of safety reflected a high quality message of a lack of 
safety commitment, as individuals perceived this contradiction as a signal of unauthentic 
commitment.  
 Descriptive aspects of messages associated with high quality message or signal of 
safety commitment included face-to-face verbal discussion of safety commitment by a 




mixed reviews on the impact of newsletters and memos within the organization that 
promote senior management’s safety commitment. This finding suggests that these types 
of materials within the organization should be used sparingly, as an abundance of 
messages can contribute to a disregard for information.  
 Receiver characteristics may also impact perception formation. Results indicated 
that participants have felt nervous when senior management visit the worksite, 
subsequently increasing focus on completing job tasks without error. Thus, it is possible 
that employees may be distracted by this emotional disposition and concentrate on the job 
task, overlooking the message of senior management’s incurred time costs. Similarly, an 
issue of trust in senior management was also described, reflected in participants’ 
descriptions of management memos and newsletters as propaganda. This lack of trust 
may cause individuals to scrutinize information sent by senior management, making 
individuals less inclined to believe messages. Distrust in management may discredit 
information sent by management (memos or newsletters), in turn influencing receiver’s 
motivation to read messages. These findings further support signaling and information-
processing theories that information processing in a complex processes, influenced by 
sender, message, and receiver characteristics. 
Results also suggest that message relevance impacts information interpretation; 
some participants described paying attention to information that was relevant to them, but 
disregarding information that was not. Furthermore, general view of information is 
supported to impact interpretation of messages from senior management. This was 
showcased through participant’s descriptions of receiving memos and newsletters from 




that they no longer read messages, and thus, no longer received these types of 
messages from senior management. These findings are in agreement with Petty and 
colleague’s (1981) findings that personal relevance of an issue impacts information 
processing whereby more relevant issues encourage deeper processing and less relevant 
issues contribute to use of heuristics. Thus, it is supported that messages of safety 
commitment more often influence perceptions when they are relevant (i.e., deemed 
useful) by the receiver.  
5.2.7 In what way are employees motivated to analyze messages of safety 
commitment? 
 Results from the study suggest that employees are motivated to analyze messages 
of safety commitment through accuracy seeking motivation. This form of motivation is 
characterized by the desire to assess the validity of presented information (Chaiken et al., 
1996). This form of motivation is supported through participants’ questioning of the 
accuracy of information contained in organizational newsletters and memos. That is, 
questioning if the C.E.O had written articles endorsed with his signature. These published 
articles contain information from senior management reflecting safety commitment, 
however, many individuals stated that they are unable to discern if these statements are 
authentic or not. Moreover, accuracy motivation is further supported by participants’ 
general view of information distributed by management. Many participants viewed 
messages from management as propaganda, or information sent for the betterment of 
managements’ image. In these cases, participants may be engaging in accuracy 
motivation, as they are motivated to scrutinize if messages are genuine or disingenuous. 




(motivation to hold attitudes viewed favourably in an interpersonal context; Chaiken 
et al., 1996). It is plausible, however, that one-on-one interviews did not provide 
appropriate assessment for this investigative question. Participants may not consciously 
perceive an attitude change to maintain opinions with that of their workgroup. Moreover, 
participants may be reluctant to admit to the researcher that their opinion was formed to 
promote in-group favourability (e.g., engagement in impression management; Leary & 
Kowalski, 1990). More investigation is needed to identify individuals’ motivation to 
analyze incoming messages of senior leader safety commitment.   
5.3 Aligning Results with the Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework outlined in Section 2 (Figure 1) illustrates the process 
of information transmission and interpretation when employees form perceptions of 
senior manager safety commitment. Results fit within the conceptual framework in that 
information from senior management was identified from one of three sources: (1) leader 
decisions inferred from observable outcomes, (2) leader behaviours (observable actions 
by the leader), or (3) other informants (information supplied by a source other than the 
senior leader). Results also support this framework in that various sender, message, and 
receiver characteristics were identified in participants’ discussions of senior manager 
safety commitment.  
In the present study, route processing antecedents were identified as individual 
phenomena (i.e. identification of all possible antecedents versus their impact on 
information route processing). Research on information processing supports that these 
phenomena contribute to combinatory or alternate route processing. As described in the 




able to scrutinize message content will exercise deep processing, carefully analyzing 
the message (Chaiken et al., 1989). Comparatively, individuals who are unable or not 
motivated to receive messages will rely on heuristics (e.g., sender or message 
characteristics) in forming perceptions (Chaiken et al., 1989). Thus, individuals who are 
unable or are not motivated to scrutinize signals of senior leader commitment will likely 
engage in cues regarding sender characteristics. This finding is noteworthy as the results 
in this study identified a range of characteristics, including descriptions of positive and 
negative senior leader attributes (e.g., trustworthy, open, respectful, disrespectful, lack of 
knowledge). Individuals who maintain a negative view of senior management’s safety 
commitment may resort to negative cues when they are not able or motivated to analyze a 
message of commitment. This result highlights the importance of ensuring signals of 
commitment are relevant and stimulating to employees, particularly for employees who 
view senior management negatively. Providing relevant and stimulating signals (signals 
that impact employees experience at the worksite and demonstrate an incurred cost by 
senior management to prioritize safety) promote the likelihood of employee motivation to 
receive signals and engage in systematic processing. In turn, this increased motivation 
and deeper processing of a message enhances the potential to improve negative 
perceptions.   
It was beyond the scope of this study to assess the cognitive mechanisms involved 
in information processing; however, previous research on information processing 
suggests that employees engage in individual or combinatory route processing (e.g., 
heuristic and/or systematic route processing; Chaiken et al., 1989) when forming 




individual components of the process of perception formation (various sources of 
information and sender, message, and receiver characteristics). Combining these findings 
with previously discussed theory, these results support the conceptual framework (Figure 
1) depicting the process of perception formation.  
5.4 Study Implications 
 The implications of this study hold theoretical and practical implications.  
Theoretically, the findings from this study reinforce previously held notions of leader 
safety commitment while providing valuable insight into an understudied area: perception 
formation of senior management’s safety commitment. Results from this study suggest 
that signals of senior manager safety commitment come from three sources: leader 
behaviours, leader decisions, and other informants. Other informants included a variety 
sources, such as supervisor and lower level management’s engagement in leadership 
behaviours. These findings demonstrate the variety of sources influencing perceptions of 
senior leader commitment. Signals of senior management’s safety commitment included 
engagement and consistency in safety leadership, allocating finances to safety, and 
ensuring policies and procedures prioritize safety. Importantly, behaviours reflecting a 
lack of safety commitment included unengaged and inconsistent safety leadership, 
neglecting to allocate resources to safety, and implementing policies and procedures that 
counteract priority for safety. Moreover, in determining authenticity of manager 
behaviour, individuals’ descriptions imply that senior management’s actions and 
decisions, as well as attributes inferred about the leader, can influence perception 
formation. These findings provide an initial understanding of senior manager safety 




across industries in senior manager behaviours and decisions reflecting safety 
commitment. 
 The findings of this venture also support the importance of practitioners 
understanding employee experiences in organizational safety development. These 
findings have implications for practitioners involved in designing and implementing 
senior management training initiatives to improve safety leadership in organizations. 
There is support in the literature that transformational leadership can be taught (Barling, 
Weber, & Kelloway, 1996), suggesting the behaviours identified in this study may be 
used in leadership training initiatives.  
Presently, safety climate questionnaires are typically used to assess safety climate 
within organizations (Flin, 2003), however, questionnaires provide a limited scope 
regarding employee experiences. The present study supports that adopting more 
investigative methods to understand employee perceptions within the organization (e.g., 
interviews or focus groups) would be a valuable addition to understanding an 
organization’s safety and developing senior leader training initiatives. Within individual 
organizations, understanding signals that influence employees’ perceptions of safety 
commitment and lack of safety commitment will allow practitioners to customize training 
developments. Understanding the unique signals experienced at an organization will 
provide a more accurate understanding of safety commitment and safety climate.  
Additionally, surveying senior management’s perceptions of safety commitment to 
identify alignment between manager and employee perceptions may be used to further 





In summary, the following points should be considered in shaping 
organizational safety development: 
 Organizations and practitioners should consider how employees perceive senior 
management’s: engagement in safety leadership throughout the organization, 
consistency in safety leadership, allocation of finances to safety, and 
implementation of policies and procedures pertaining to safety.  
 Organizations and practitioners should consider how employees’ perceive a lack 
of commitment by senior management, including: unengaged safety leadership, 
inconsistent safety leadership, a neglect to allocate resources to safety, and 
policies and procedures that counteract safety.  
 Following identification of the aforementioned phenomena, focus should be 
placed on strengthening senior leader behaviours that positively impact 
perceptions and mitigating behaviours that influence negative perceptions. This 
includes promoting consistent demonstration of acts that exhibit incurred cost of 
time or money to prioritize the immediate safety of employees. As part of this 
practice, organizations and practitioners should strive to enhance the delivery and 
interpretation of signals of positive safety commitment by considering source, 
message, and receiver characteristics that may enhance or impede this process. 
For example, perceived leader attributes, the medium through which the message 
is relayed, message descriptive characteristics, and employee motivation and 
ability to receive the message should be considered so that signals may be tailored 




 The extent to which senior management establish and maintain relationships 
with employees should be considered to enhance the likelihood of perceived 
manager authenticity. Additionally, organizations and practitioners should aim to 
shape senior leader behaviour to demonstrate authenticity through promotion of 
behaviours relating to individualized consideration, honesty, and trustworthiness. 
This includes fostering the consistent practice of: (1) visiting the worksite, (2) 
discussing safety matters with employees and providing coaching and feedback to 
employees that demonstrates a knowledge of job tasks and risks, (3) 
demonstrating open communication by seeking feedback and ideas from 
employees by asking questions, (4) ensuring employees are kept informed of 
management decision-making (5) ensuring raised safety concerns are met with 
visible outcomes, (6) maintaining fair and realistic expectations, (7) leading by 
example, (8) commending safety compliance, and (9) prioritizing safety over 
production.  
5.5 Qualitative Research Considerations 
5.5.1 Role of the Researcher 
Scientific inquiry utilizes validated instruments for research purposes, and thus, 
the researcher is essentially removed from these aspects of the study (Golafshani, 2003). 
In qualitative inquiry, however, the researcher is considered an instrument used in data 
collection and analysis (Golafshani, 2003). It is, therefore, important that the researcher 





The researcher had experience with the participant organization prior to the 
present investigation. This experience included working as a research assistant of Saint 
Mary’s University that partnered with the participant organization to develop a safety 
program. The researcher was therefore exposed to discussions regarding the 
organization’s culture, leadership functioning, and safety functioning, as well as meetings 
and focus groups involving organizational members, prior to the present study. The 
position of research assistant and work with the participant organization was maintained 
prior to and for the duration of the present research venture. The researcher conducted the 
present study’s participant interviews, analysis of interview data, and production of the 
resulting report. The study’s method of qualitative analysis and results from analysis were 
discussed in detail with committee members to mitigate bias. However, it is 
acknowledged that the researchers’ knowledge of literature in the area of leadership 
influence and organizational safety (including safety climate, safety culture, and manager 
safety commitment), and experience with the participant organization may have 
influenced bias during interviews or analysis.  
Attempt to mitigate bias was made through a series of practices, including: use of 
a systematic analysis approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006); maintenance of awareness for the 
potential of personal bias that could impact data collection and interpretation; use of 
previously constructed and committee-reviewed interview questions; use of iterative 
questioning in interviews to clarify understanding; reflecting on interviews after each 
were completed to consider the researcher’s performance; reflective appraisal of the 




5.5.2 Trustworthiness (Validity and Reliability) 
Approaches in the scientific method to assess the rigour of a research venture are 
popularly known and include tests for internal validity, external validity, and reliability 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1986). These methods do not apply to qualitative investigations, 
however, as qualitative inquiry does not use these evaluative techniques (Lincoln and 
Guba 1986). Thus, the rigour of a qualitative study must be established through other 
means. Lincoln and Guba (1985) devised criteria that parallel standards for establishing 
rigour in the scientific method and termed this standard: trustworthiness of the data. 
Trustworthiness is garnered through the establishment of credibility (confidence in the 
“truth” of the findings), transferability (findings are applicable in other contexts), 
dependability (findings would be repeated in a similar research venture), and 
confirmability (findings are determined by the subjects and non-biasing characteristics of 
the researcher). The following sections address how each criteria was addressed in the 
present study. 
Credibility. Credibility, akin to internal validity in experimental inquiry, was 
established through detailed discussion and iterative questioning in interviews to ensure 
clarification and prevent misinformation (member checks; Lincoln & Guba, 1986). 
Credibility was also supported through the researchers use of trust building (Shenton, 
2004); the researcher discussed the confidentiality of participant’s information and 
explained the researcher’s background and motivation for research to build trust with 
participants. The researcher attempted to maintain awareness for the potential of personal 
biases that may impact data via a priori values and constructions by following previously 




awareness of questions used to probe responses in the interview, and reflecting on 
interviews after completion to consider the researcher’s performance (Shenton, 2004). 
Furthermore, credibility was enhanced through data collection at two job sites in different 
provinces and from participants who maintained a range of work experiences and 
represented a variety of work positions (Shenton, 2004). As suggested by Shenton 
(2004), peer scrutiny of the research project was established through practitioner and 
academic feedback during a presentation of the proposed investigation at local safety-
related conferences, as well as thesis committee member review and feedback during the 
proposal and main stages of the project. 
Transferability. Guba and Lincoln (1994) contend that transferability (akin to 
generalizability in experimental inquiry) is achieved through detailed description of time, 
place, context, and culture in which data is collected. Shenton (2004) provided 
comparable, but more specific recommendations to achieve this quality, and will be the 
method followed in this study. Shenton (2004) states: 
 “…information on the following issues should be given at the outset: (a) the 
number of organizations taking part in the study and where they are based, (b) any 
restrictions in the type of people who contributed data, (c) the number of 
participants involved in the fieldwork, (d) the data collection methods that were 
employed, (e) the number and length of the data collection sessions, (f) the time 
period over which the data was collected” (p. 70).  
To meet requirements of transferability, full disclosure of these criteria were included in 




Dependability and Confirmability. Dependability and confirmability relate 
to a qualitative study’s reliability in that they represent the extent to which a study could 
be replicated (using the same methods and participants) to achieve similar results 
(Shenton, 2004).    
  Dependability was sought by providing a detailed account of the steps taken in 
data collection and analysis, described in the method section of this paper (Shenton, 
2004). Providing detail of these processes facilitates scrutiny by fellow researchers of the 
steps taken, as well as replication of the study to verify consistent results. Following 
Shenton’s (2004) recommendation, this study provided descriptions of  “the research 
design and its implementation [and] the operational detail of data gathering…” (p. 71). 
The research design and implementation as well as operational detail of data gathering 
are included in the methods section of this document. The author’s reflective appraisal of 
the project was maintained alongside field notes during the research process.  
Finally, confirmability was demonstrated through inclusion of the methods 
adopted and the strengths and reasoning for using these approaches (Shenton, 2004).  
Moreover, consistent with Shenton’s (2004) recommendations, results from data analysis 
were discussed in full, including a priori theories that were not found in the data.  
5.6 Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations exist in the present study. First, causal conclusions cannot be made 
about the process of perception formation, as an experimental method was not used; 
however, qualitative investigation provided an understanding of experience that 
experimental methods cannot produce (detailed descriptions of participant experiences).  




It is possible employees engaged in impression management (Leary & Kowalski, 
1990) when describing management who are committed or not committed to safety. 
Attempts to minimize participant impression management were made by explaining 
verbally and in writing the confidentiality of information disclosed in interview sessions.  
Third, because data collection occurred during one-day worksite visits, individual 
interviews were limited to a maximum of one hour. Interviews averaged around 46 
minutes; thus, it is possible that time pressure impacted some participants ability to 
provide comprehensive answers for all interview questions.  
This study is an initial step in understanding how employees perceive senior 
manager safety commitment. Additional research should investigate the transferability of 
the present study through replication in other high-risk organizations. The present study 
identified a number of attributes, behaviours, and decisions that influence employee 
perceptions of senior manager safety commitment; however, additional research should 
investigate the combination of characteristics that best promote perceptions of 
commitment. In line with this notion, future studies should investigate the order of senior 
management’s safety-related cost allocation (or lack of allocation) that demonstrates 
extent of safety commitment. Particularly, as this study’s findings differed with previous 
research (e.g., Flin, 2003), the role of manpower should be investigated in more detail to 
determine the extent of this cost on employee perceptions. Individual’s engagement in 
systematic and heuristic route processing when forming perceptions of commitment may 
also be explored, and the present study’s conceptual framework may be tested empirically 




Further research should also aid in understanding how individuals’ are 
motivated to interpret messages of commitment (e.g., accuracy seeking motivation versus 
impression motivation). Additionally, as mentioned in the literature review, investigation 
of the functioning of countersignals and distortion from environment on perception 
formation should be explored, as it will provide greater insight into employee perception 
formation. Alignment between senior manager and employee perceptions is another area 
of future research that should be investigated. Determining the behaviours, decisions, and 
attributes that reflect safety commitment for both employees and senior managers will 
provide valuable insight regarding organizational safety climate. Moreover, determining 
the behaviours or actions senior managers must engage in to change individuals’ 
perceptions of safety commitment is another avenue of research that may be studied. 
Identifying the length of time and types of behaviours management must engage in to 
change employee perceptions from lack of commitment to authentic commitment will 
provide valuable insight for researchers and practitioners. 
5.7 Conclusion 
It is well known that understanding and improving safety within organizations is a 
critical venture. The present study adds to this initiative by utilizing qualitative 
methodology to provide an in-depth look at employee perceptions of senior manager 
safety commitment. Results from this study suggest that signals of safety commitment are 
channelled through senior leader decisions, behaviours, and other informants. Moreover, 
results support that perception formation is a complex process impacted by a variety of 
sender, message, and receiver characteristics. Manager behaviours or decisions that 




individual’s safety, broadly surmised as: engaged safety leadership, consistent safety 
leadership, the allocation of money to safety, and implementation of policies and 
procedures that reflect a value for safety. Moreover, to better understand employee 
perceptions, participant’s observations of a lack of safety commitment were solicited. In 
sum, these perceptions reflected managers who are unengaged or inconsistent in safety 
leadership, who neglect to allocate resources for money, or who implement policies and 
procedures that counteract a priority for safety.  
Participant descriptions suggest that the strongest indication of management’s 
value for safety is the consistent demonstration of incurred cost of time or money in order 
to ensure the immediate safety of employees. In addition to this, the authenticity of 
management’s commitment may be best indicated through behaviours and decisions that 
promote individualized consideration and a value for employee safety. A variety of leader 
attributes were also mentioned by participants in describing how to tell if someone is 
authentic (e.g., honesty, friendliness, intelligence, and humility). Additionally, having 
met senior management (i.e., having a relationship) was supported to have a significant 
impact in allowing some participants to discern authenticity. Several individuals 
described being unable to make inferences about senior management’s genuine concern 
for safety due to never meeting the individual. Finally, descriptive aspects of the message 
and their role in perception formation suggest that certain mediums (e.g., verbal) and 
qualities (e.g., one-on-one discussion) promote more positive perceptions. 
In conclusion, this study contributes to the organizational safety evidence-base in 
providing a greater understanding of the process of senior leader perception formation. 




understanding of senior leader safety leadership and betterment of practitioner led 
safety development training. The present investigation is a first step in identifying the 
process of perception formation of senior leader safety commitment and provides 
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1. Think of a senior manager who is very committed to safety: 
a. Describe to me how you know this senior manager is committed to safety 
i. In what ways do you notice this behaviour? 
Prompts: Do you observe them directly, hear stories by colleagues, 
infer them from the work environment? Through what technical 
mediums are messages relayed? 
 
b. Describe to me the type of senior management behaviour you think shows the 
greatest commitment to safety 
i. In what ways do you notice this behaviour? 
Prompts: Do you observe them directly, hear stories by colleagues, 
infer them from the work environment? Through what technical 
mediums are messages relayed? 
 
2. Think of a senior manager who is not committed to safety: 
a. Describe to me how you know this senior manager is not committed to safety? 
i. In what ways do you notice these behaviours?  
Prompts: Do you observe them directly, hear stories by colleagues, 
infer them from the work environment? Through what technical 
mediums are messages relayed? 
 
b. Describe to me what type of senior management behaviour you think shows 
the greatest disregard for safety?  
i. In what ways do you notice these behaviours? 
Prompts: Do you observe them directly, hear stories by colleagues, 
infer them from the work environment? Through what technical 
mediums are messages relayed? 
 
3. Tell me about how you can tell a manager is authentic in his/her commitment to 
safety?  
a. What types of characteristics lead you to think they are authentic? 
i. Prompts: How do you perceive that a leader is self-aware, honest, 
and/or transparent? Do you observe them directly, hear stories by 
colleagues, infer them from the work environment? Through what 
technical mediums are messages relayed? 
b. What types of characteristics lead you to think they are not authentic? 
i. Prompts: What kinds of behaviours, decision-making, outside 
information lead you to form this opinion? Do you observe them 
directly, hear stories by colleagues, infer them from the work 








Please state your gender: __________ 
 




Please state your age: _____________ 
 
What is the title of your current employment position?: _______________        ☐N/A 
 
How long have you been employed in this role?: _______________        ☐N/A 
 
What type of industry do you work in? _______________        ☐N/A 
 
How many people work in the organization you work in (including all locations)?  
(An estimate is fine) ____________________        ☐N/A  
 











If ‘Yes’, please briefly describe your involvement with senior managemenet and a rough 














Informed Consent Form 
Understanding Perceptions of Senior Leader Safety Commitment 
REB # 15-265 
 
Kate C. Bowers 
Department of Psychology 




I am a Masters of Science student in Psychology at Saint Mary’s University (SMU), and I 
would like to invite you to participate in a study aimed at understanding perceptions of 
senior leader safety commitment.  
 
Participation in the study is voluntary and involves participating in an interview (one-on-
one discussion session with a researcher). You will be asked to provide personal 
experiences and opinions related to senior managers’ safety behaviour. Your responses 
will be kept confidential to the research team and there is no way of identifying your 
information with your name. You are free to withdraw from the study without penalty 
before July 15th, 2015. After this date data analysis will have begun and it will be 
impossible to identify or remove your individual information from the study. If you 
choose to withdraw, any information gathered will be destroyed and will not be included 
in the study. 
 
PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to better understand senior leader safety commitment. Our 
goal is to better understand how employees form perceptions of senior leader safety 
behaviour, that is, the process of perception formation. We aim to understand what senior 
leader safety commitment looks like to you and how you come to form this perception. 
This knowledge will improve understanding of safety leadership, potentially advancing 
organizational safety management practices.  
 
WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO TAKE PART? 
This study targets workers in Canadian high-risk industries who have been employed at 
their current organization for at least 6 months. 
 
WHAT DOES PARTICIPATING MEAN?  
You will be participating in a 60 to 90 minute interview with a researcher. The interview 
will occur after you have completed the signed consent form and asked any questions you 
have. Participation will include thinking of a senior leader within your organization (e.g., 
CEO, President, etc.) and discussing the behaviours that reflect a priority or disregard for 
safety. You will also be asked to disclose (via confidential survey) some demographic 
information, including gender, age, and how long you have been an employee with your 




given a $50.00 VISA card at the conclusion of the interview for your participation. 
Funding for gift cards is provided by Saint Mary’s University CN Professorship in Safety 
Culture. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THIS RESEARCH? 
There are no direct foreseeable benefits with participating in this study. Participating in 
this study will contribute to organizational and academic understanding of how 
employees form perceptions of senior leader safety commitment. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS FOR PARTICIPANTS? 
You may feel uncomfortable answering some questions asked in this interview. This may 
be due to your relationship with senior management and experience with safety in your 
organization. 
 
If you do become upset during or after the interview, you can contact Dr. Mark Fleming 
at (902) 496-8287 or mark.fleming@smu.ca or Dr. Jim Cameron (902) 420-5728 or 
ethics@smu.ca for assistance.  
 
WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH MY INFORMATION? 
Your name and contact information will only be used for the purposes of conducting the 
interview. This information will be used to schedule a time for you to participate in the 
study and send relevant research materials. This information will not be linked with your 
interview transcript and will only be made available to the research team. Audio 
recording and written documentation will be used to complete an academic report as well 
as provide aggregate information to your organization on how senior management safety 
commitment is perceived by employees. Your personal information will not be directly 
connected with your responses; responses will be anonymous in any and all research 
papers, publications, and communications with your organization. 
 
All information collected in this study will be stored on password-protected computers 
and will only be accessible by the research team members and professionals hired to 
transcribe material. Your information will not be shared with anyone else. Data will be 
stored for 5 years before being destroyed.  
 
Please note that any information you provide will not impact your current or future 
employment with your organization. 
   
HOW CAN I WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY? 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have the right to participate or 
not, and if you choose to participate, you can withdraw from the study at any time during 
your interview participation. Withdrawal may be completed by requesting to skip 
interview questions or by notifying the interviewer that you do not wish to continue. It is 
important to note that once data analysis has begun (July 15th, 2015) it will be impossible 
to remove your responses. Your responses will never be linked with your name and 





HOW CAN I GET MORE INFORMATION? 
Information or questions regarding this study may be requested at any time from Kate 
Bowers at kate.bowers@smu.ca or Dr. Mark Fleming at mark.fleming@smu.ca or (902) 
420 5237. If you have any questions or concerns about ethical matters, you may contact 
the Chair of the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or 420-
5728. This research has been reviewed and approved by the Saint Mary's University 






Statement of Agreement 
 
I understand what this study is about, appreciate the risks and benefits, and that by 
consenting I agree to take part in this research study and do not waive any rights to legal 
recourse in the event of research-related harm. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can end my participation at any 
time without penalty.  
 
I have had adequate time to think about the research study and have had the opportunity 
to ask questions.  
       
 

















Understanding Perceptions of Senior Leader Safety Commitment 
REB # 15-265 
 
Kate C. Bowers 
Department of Psychology 




Written consent will first be sought using signed consent forms approved by the Saint 
Mary’s University Research Ethics Board. 
 
Introductory Script: Welcome and thank-you for agreeing to participate in this 
interview. Your input is a valuable asset to this research venture. My name is Kate 
Bowers and I am part of a researcher team at Saint Mary’s University investigating how 
employees form perceptions of senior manager safety commitment. I would like to 
remind you that your participation is voluntary, and you may chose to end your 
participation in any time. You may also feel free to skip any interview questions you do 
not wish to answer. Any information you provide will be confidential and your personal 
information will never be directly connected with your responses. Information you 
provide will be used in an academic report and aggregate data will be relayed back to 
your organization to help them understand how employees form perceptions of senior 




Request for participant to complete a demographic survey:. 
 Allow 5 minutes to fill out form (address any questions that arise) 
 Collect form 
 Thank participant 
 
Discuss the utility/focus of interview: 
 Ask if participant has participated in an interview before 
 Explain why/how it is a valuable tool for collecting data 
o In this research venture interviews will allow us to gain more in-depth 
information regarding how perceptions of senior leader safety 
commitment are formed. Using a one-on-one discussion facilitates a 
comfortable, confidential environment and flexibility in gaining answers 
to our research questions.  
 
Discuss logistics of the session: 
 Length of interview: 60-90 minutes 




 Discuss bathroom options, exit location, and safety protocol (e.g., evacuation 
procedure)  
 
Inform participant that audio recording will now commence: 
 Ensure participant is comfortable and consents to recording 
 Commence audio recording 
 
Ask participant if he/she has any questions before starting: 
 Address any questions 
 
Commence interview questions:  





 End audio recording 
 Thank for participation 
 Address any remaining questions 
 Provide feedback form and discuss content on form (i.e., how to withdraw, how to 
acquire research results). 







Participant Feedback Form 
Understanding Perceptions of Senior Leader Safety Commitment 
REB # 15-265 
 
Kate C. Bowers 
Department of Psychology 




Thank you very much for participating in this study. 
 
Today you have chosen to take part in a discussion concerning senior leader safety 
commitment. Your views on this subject contribute to a greater understanding of how 
employees form perceptions of senior leader safety commitment. In turn, this knowledge 
will improve understanding of safety leadership, potentially advancing organizational 
safety management practices.  
 
The information you provided today will remain confidential and stored securely on 
password-protected computers shared only with research members and professionals 
hired to transcribe material. Your responses will be used in academic text and 
presentations and aggregate data will be provided to your organization to foster 
understanding of how senior management safety commitment is viewed. Your responses 
will not be identifiable; printed information cannot be traced back to you. 
 
For questions or more information about this research, or to request a summary of the 
study’s results, please contact a member of the research team (expected completion date: 
August 31, 2015):  
 
Kate Bowers at kate.bowers@smu.ca 
Dr. Mark Fleming at mark.fleming@smu.ca or (902) 420 5237 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about ethical matters, you may contact the Chair of 
the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at ethics@smu.ca or 420-5728. This 











*Denotes codes established from the data 






priority for safety 




Allocates money to purchase of small goods before allocating money to mitigate 
safety issues* 
Connelly et al. 
(2011) 
Furhen et al. 
(2014a, 2014b) 
Flin (2003) 
Flin & Yule (2004) 
Brainstorming with 
SME 
Allocates money to safety 
Allocates manpower to safety 
Allocates money to repair, inspect, or purchase equipment or infrastructure* 
Allocates money to safety training* 
Allocates money to safety programs/initiatives* 
Allocates time to safety 
Implements new safety rules in response to accidents/incidents* 
Ensures all levels of management practice safety leadership* 
Ensures changes in safety functioning require a formal approval process at the 
executive level* 
Ensures positions within the organization are dedicated to safety* 
Ensures memos and reports focus on safety* 
Fails to ensure all levels of management engage in safety leadership* 
Hiring process does not reflect a value for safety* 
Lack of compassion* 
Neglects to allocate manpower to safety* 
Neglects to allocate money to safety* 
Neglects to allocate money to repair, inspect, or purchase equipment or infrastructure* 
Neglects to allocate sufficient manpower to ensure safe completion of tasks* 
Policy/Procedure does not reflect a value for safety* 
Policy/Procedure reflects a value for safety 
Pressure for work overrides value for safety* 
Problem solves 
Production pressure does not precede value for safety* 
Punitive process does not reflect a value for safety* 
Provides means for contact* 
Rewards safety compliance 
Safety rules do not reflect a value for safety* 
Shuts down safety programs to reduce costs* 





reflect a priority 





Addresses/meets safety concerns in a timely manner 
Connelly et al. 
(2011) 
Furhen et al. 
(2014a, 2014b) 
Flin (2003) 




Consistent in actions/behaviours over time 
Demonstrates concern for the employee* 
Disrespects employees* 
Does not follow through on statements* 
Does not lead by example* 
Does not speak about safety* 
Does not trust employees* 
Does not visit the worksite* 
Enforces safety rules 
Follows through on statements* 
Involved in safety matters 
Lack of safety knowledge* 
Lack of feedback regarding raised safety concerns* 
Leads by example 
Maintains fair and realistic expectations* 
Maintains unfavourable or unrealistic expectations* 
Open/approachable  
Open to receiving concerns, feedback, or questions* 
Participative leadership 
Positive attitude about safety 
Provides coaching and constructive feedback to employees 
Provides timely feedback and promotes transparency* 
Punishes employees for safety incidents* 




Respects and values the work group 
Safety knowledge 
Shares information about safety statistics and safety-related processes in 
organization* 
Social competence 
Speaks about safety 
Takes time to listen and considers suggestions before acting* 







relayed by an 
indirect source) 
Information inferred from a lack of safety incidents/accidents at the worksite* 




Information/stories from colleagues’ experience/disposition (e.g., supervisor and 
middle management leadership practices)* 
Information/stories from family* 
Information/stories from other informants (e.g., stranger)* 
Information/stories from supervisor/middle management 
Online video media (online presentation by senior management) 
Overheard information/stories (e.g., overheard phone calls)* 
Printed article from organization (e.g., organizational magazine, newsletter, poster) 
Printed media (e.g., news story in newspaper) 










Chaiken & Eagly 
(1987) 
Petty & Cacioppo 
(1986) 


















Lack of knowledge* 


















Abundance of messages* Bhattacheriee & 
Sandford (2006) 
Chaiken (1980) 
Connelly et al. 
(2011) 
Petty, Cacioppo, & 
Goldman (1981) 
Petty et al. (1983) 
Brainstorming with 
SME 
Direct (message focused only on safety)* 
Indirect (message intertwined with other info)* 
Verbal in person 
Verbal over phone 
Written (addressed to many) 





attributable to the 








Petty & Cacioppo 
(1986) 







Summary of Themes and Subthemes 
 

















Participants described commitment to safety as management who 
demonstrated an active, open, and respectful approach to safety 
management. This included visiting the worksite multiple times 
each year, ensuring lower level management engage in safety 
commitment behaviours, asking about and listening to employee 
concerns, and demonstrating value and respect for employees. 
Active Safety 
Leadership 
Leadership characterized by active involvement at the frontline level. 
This included descriptions of senior management visiting the 
worksite, discussing safety matters with employees and providing 
feedback to employees, demonstrating knowledge of frontline tasks 
and safety policies and procedures, rewarding safety compliance, and 
addressing safety concerns in a timely manner. Ensuring all other 
levels of management engage in safety leadership behaviours was 




Leadership characterized by an open and approachable demeanour 
that promotes communication between frontline employees and 
management. This included descriptions of senior management 
providing means for contact and being open to receiving concerns, 
feedback, or questions. Additionally, this included senior 
management moving on from disagreements, and sharing information 
about safety statistics and safety-related processes in the organization. 
Respectful 
Leadership 
Leadership characterized by trust and value for employees. 
Descriptions included senior management ensuring employees receive 
coaching (constructive feedback) when a mistake is made and 
ensuring management expectations are fair and realistic (i.e., 




Consistency in safety leadership behaviour was commonly 
described among participants. Individuals expressed that leaders 
who abide by the policy and procedure they promote, follow 
through on statements, and consistently prioritize safety over 
production reflected senior management’s commitment to safety. 
Sincere Safety 
Leadership 
Sincere safety leadership included descriptions of senior management 
implementing and abiding by safety rules and following through on 
statements made in addressing safety concerns. 
Unwavering 
Position to Work 
Safely 
Unwavering position to work safely included descriptions of senior 
management never compromising safety for production and 
consistently maintaining safety as a top priority. 
Allocating Money 
to Safety 
Participants expressed that allocation of money to safety 
demonstrated senior management’s value for safety. This includes 
purchasing of new equipment and equipment repairs, paying for 
inspection of equipment, allocating money to safety training and 
safety programs, and ensuring finances are spent towards meeting 











a Value for Safety 
Individuals stated that committed senior leadership is demonstrated 
through organizational policies and procedures that reflect a value 
for safety. This includes policies and procedures that reflect a 
priority for employee safety and promote transparency of 
management decision-making. 
Management of 
Safety is People 
Focused 
Descriptions included that policies and procedures developed and 
approved by senior management reflect a priority for employee 
safety. This included development and enforcement of safety rules 
with a clear focus on keeping employees safe and management of 
employee behaviour being structured to provide coaching and 
constructive feedback versus punitive action. 
Safety is a priority 
in policies and 
procedures 
 
Descriptions included that policies and procedures ensure that 
changes to safety functioning (e.g., safety rules) within the 
organization require a formal approval process at the executive level, 
positions within the organization are dedicated to safety, and memos 
and reports published in the company and distributed to employees 






















Participants described a lack of safety commitment to as 
management who are passive in safety leadership, who do not 
provide adequate feedback to promote transparency in decision 
making, who maintain a punitive focus with a lack of coaching, and 
who demonstrate a lack of respect. 
Passive Safety 
Leadership 
Leadership characterized by inactive involvement at the frontline 
level. This included senior management not visiting the worksite, not 
speaking with employees about safety, and having a lack of 
knowledge about job tasks and safety policy and procedure. Passive 
safety leadership was also characterized by a neglect to ensure other 




Leadership characterized by a lack of communication and openness 
between frontline employees and management. This included 
descriptions of senior management neglecting to provide feedback in 
response to raised safety concerns and management decision-making. 
Lack of Respect in 
Safety Leadership 
Leadership characterized by a lack of respect or value for employees. 
Participants described managers adopting a punitive focus and 
concern for punishing employees instead of providing constructive 
feedback. Descriptions also included vengeful management 




Inconsistency in safety leadership behaviour was described as an 
indication of a lack of safety commitment. Participants expressed 
that leaders who do not follow through on statements made about 
safety improvement, do not abide by the rules they are promoting, 




Insincere safety leadership was described as inconsistent and 
contradictory management behaviour. This included not following 
through with action when addressing raised safety concerns and not 
leading by example. 
Value for 
Production 
Exceeds Value for 
Safety 
Leadership behaviour described as management who compromise 
safety for production, including pressuring employees and turning a 









Participant’s descriptions of a lack of safety commitment also 
included managements’ neglect to allocate resources to safety. 
Descriptions included failing to provide money to purchase and 
repair equipment, and failing to ensure sufficient staff to complete 
tasks safely in the expected timeframe. 
 
Neglecting to 
allocate Money to 
Safety 
Neglecting to allocate money to safety was described as management 
neglecting to purchase or repair equipment, neglecting to fund 
equipment inspections, neglecting to purchase or repair infrastructure, 
and management purchasing small goods before allocating money to 





Neglecting to allocate manpower to safety was described as 
management neglecting to provide appropriate manpower to ensure 






Participants noted that policies and procedures can counteract 
safety prioritization, demonstrating a lack of safety commitment. 
This included discrepancies in punitive procedure, issues in hiring 
policies and procedures, and the creation and implementation of 








Table of Responses Reflecting Leader Decisions and Behaviours 
 





Visits worksite to 
monitor staff 
   B B    B B B  B  
B: "they have one fella 
like I say, he runs the 
whole show […] and he 
shows up once a year, 
twice a year, he’ll come 
in and see if everything is 
right you know." 
Speaks about 
safety 
   B B B   B B   B  
B: "he promotes safety, 
you know every time he’s 
here there’s always talk 
about safety. He will start 
out with different 
instances that happened." 
Safety 
knowledge 
  D      B      
B: "I think if they 
actually kind of did the 
same thing more that we 
did and looked up the 
rule of the day, and [...] 
make us believe that they 
care about safety a little 
more." 
 
D: "...we got better tools, 
and I have the proper 
tools to work with and 
such [...] [the previous 
C.E.O] wasn’t really one 
for repairing or doing any 
kind of work [...]. [The 
present C.E.O] is 
knowledgeable and 
seems to have more of a, 
he wants the cars to run 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
especially with the 
[safety incidents] and 




in a timely 
manner 
 B  B      B  B B  
B:"…the feedback that 
you get is definitely, if 
it’s positive or I mean, 
I’m happy even with it 
being negative, but at 
least you get some 
information, get educated 
on the situation." 
Enforces safety 
rules 
 D        B     
B:  "they take corrective 
action and tell you" 
D: "I know he had a 
courier in Moncton, 
refused to let him back 
on the property because 
he was using a cell 
phone, driving on the 
road right so my view of 
him is strong" 
Rewards safety 
compliance 
   B B     D  B   
B: "...she hands him a 
hard hat and safety 
glasses and [the C.E.O] 
was very appreciative of 
it, he thought it was 
awesome, thought it was 
great that she did that. So 
I mean it could, these are 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
company so these are the 
rules that he rolls out and 
he doesn’t have a hard 
hat and safety glasses on, 
I would say that he would 
expect somebody to call 
him out on it." 
D: "...every year we get a 
safety bonus, it’s, I 
believe it’s in November 
it comes out and [the 
company] and the 
management of our 
terminal will purchase or 
give us x amount of 
dollars to spend as 
congratulations, we’ve 
made it another year." 




    D   D       
D: "Yah it would be 
pretty, it would put a 
pretty bad taste in their 
mouth I would think if 
they seen somebody, a 
senior person, not 
following safety rules, 
specific safety rules but 
they are required to do 






     B         
B: "if we could see some 
of that stuff and maybe 
given a phone number 
even above or whoever is 
in charge of making the 
decision, like I’m sure 
he’s probably a ways up 
the management pole so 
he doesn’t want a bunch 
of phone calls from all 
these people but if we 
had some way of getting 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
that’s involved with the 
decision and see like 
what’s their reasons..."  





          B    
B: "just listening and like 
not just being stuck on 
one certain way of doing 
something. Taking 
suggestions and taking a 
minute to actually go 
through different 







B    B     B B B   
B: "that’s kind of the way 
they receive it as well, 
like if there’s something 
you don’t like, please tell 










 B  B   D  B  D    
B: "they’ll just show you 
like different incidents 
that we had and talk 
about them, how are we 
going to prevent this 
from happening again? 
Root causes of the 
accident, why it 
happened, it’s usually 
broke down into every 
individual incident that 
happened. 
D: "when I did the peer 
education, I would get 
copies of all incidents in 
the east that happened 









concern for the 
employee 
           B B  
B: "[the C.E.O] wants to 
talk about the person, not 
talking about the job, not 
talking about what 
happened yesterday or 
today, he will maybe at 
the tail end. [He wants to] 
find out about you, what 
makes you happy, what’s 






   B B B         
B: "I’d say that most of 
the time the message is a 
lot better than the action. 
It definitely is, I mean 
you can sit down and talk 
to somebody and 
encourage them not to do 
it again or explain why it 
happened or what could 
happen and instead of 
you know [unclear] give 
them, like you don’t have 
your job, he leaves pissed 





     D  D D      
B: "I trust my managers 
to not put me in a 
situation that they 







 B    B         
B: "we don’t see who 
else above him is 
involved in the decision 
or we rarely ever hear the 
outcome of the decision 
so, if we could see some 
of that stuff […] I’m sure 






Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
Leads by 
example 
B B  B B          
B: "That’s just one 
example, practicing what 
they preach, so actually 
they say they value safety 
and they put in all these 
rules, following those 
rules I guess, so if they’re 
visiting a site maybe 
wearing the equipment 






position to work 
safely 
D      D        
D: "I guess they don’t 
compromise like the 
situation gets tough, they 
don’t compromise and 
say o.k. well let’s just do 
it this one time. It’s 
always, they put their 
foot down and they say 
no this isn’t safe we’re 
not going to do it." 
Production 
pressure does not 
precede value for 
safety 
    D D D   D     
D:  "I’ve seen him shut 
down a [worksite] for 
unsafe working 
conditions for us right 
[…] we shut these people 
down and that’s big 
dollars right, I’ve seen 
him do that" 








  D  D D     D    
D: "I, all you know my 
cover-alls, boots, glasses, 
everything is paid by the 
company. Never an issue 
to get." 
Allocates money 
to safety training 
     D         
 
D: "a company that was 
truly committed to safety 
I think they’d be a little 
more willing to spend the 
money needed on 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
training. Training 
especially actually now 
that I think of it, on how 
to be safe, on proper 
procedures for things, 





    D  D        
 
D: I know they must 
support [the safety 
program], they’re paying 
for it. 
Policy/Procedure 
Reflects a Value 
for Safety 
Management 







 D D D D  D D  D D   D 
 
D: "for the most part I 
mean they are good, 
they’ve got a lot of rules 
in place because 
something happened to 
somebody so they make 
sure it doesn’t happen to 
anybody else." 
Implements new 




       D  D     
 
D: "what it seems like if 
anything happens 
anywhere in the system, 
well we have a new 
safety rule. Well 
somebody got hurt in 
Calgary and o.k. well 
we’re going to change the 
safety, this is the way it 
should be, which I 
understand." 







require a formal 
approval process 
at the executive 
level 
    D          
 
D: "I mean like I said 
these are the rules, and I 
know that [the C.E.O] is 
involved on different 
committees like when 
there’d be a different 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
that would come out, that 
it has to go to him to be 
approved right, it just 
can’t be, one guy, I can’t 
just ask a guy o.k. can I 
do it this way now, it has 
to be, it has to go through 
the approval committee 
before we can change a 
process or procedure, so 






         D     
D: "Well their positions 
are about safety so I 
would say it’s top 




priority for safety 
D    D  D   D   D  
D: "...they try and send 
the message and like 
there’s, the whole thing is 
based on you know either 
safety or employees and 
like, I don’t know how 
accurate the information 
is in it, but they present it 
that it is about safety and 
it’s a culture about safety 






Lack of safety 
knowledge 
    B B B  B    B  
B: "he asked us what the 
rule of the day is, we 
have a rule of the day, 
every day, and he asked 
us but I don’t think he 
knew himself right, you 
know what I mean, but 
it’s true and they’re really 
all like that. The only 
thing they have they just 
ask what’s the rule of the 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
them anything, they’d say 
o.k." 
Does not visit the 
worksite 
     D         
D: "...they don’t see us so 
we might be a number on 
their page..." 
Does not speak 
about safety 
            B  
B: "a lack of 
communication […] 
someone who never talks 
about safety…" 
Fails to ensure all 
levels of 
management 
engage in safety 
leadership 
            D D 
 
D: "Well, it trickles, it 
has to trickle down to 
right down through the 
senior VPs, down to the 
general managers, right 
down to the [supervisors] 
right. He can say all he 
wants as the president but 
he’s not around all these 
small terminals to see 
what is underneath him. 
The managers are 
actually implementing 






Lack of feedback 
regarding raised 
safety concerns 
 D    D    D D    
D: “I’d rather see that 
we’re not having the 
finances, at least we have 
a reason to why it’s not 













     D         
 
D: "We rarely hear 
directly from them, like it 
comes back to like 
(41:28) when they’re 
hiding in the bushes 
watching us work, they’ll 
be the one to put in the 
report and say that we  
were doing this unsafe, 
but they’ll get one of 
their underlings to come 





D     D D     D   
 
D: "three incidents 
happened here[...] 
yesterday, there were two 
[incidents] and an injury. 
So right away the call 
comes down from senior 
management, a safety 
blitz. So now they’ll be 
out nailing for all those 
things that they let go by 
for the last x amount of 
time, so yah, it’s 
overlooked at times and 
other times it isn’t, so 
that generally comes 





D     D         
 
D: "if they asked us to do 
some work that they 
wouldn’t do themselves, 
it’s kind of hard to see 
anyway but it’s easy for 
them to say one thing and 
mean another. It’s like oh 
yah we don’t want you to 
do that work, it’s unsafe 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
the productivity envelope 
so much that it’s like 
there’s no other way for 
it to happen. If you want 
productivity, you’re 
asking us to do this 
unsafely. " 
Does not trust 
employees 
      D       D 
D: "Senior management 
did not believe that we 
could operate that well, 
so they sent in a testing 
team, very masterful 
drama out of Montreal 
and then a senior 
manager and 
superintendent and then a 
couple of other ones 
right, and they sent them 
in and we were 98% 
good so we proved that 
we could do it right. But 
they don’t believe it 
right, so and that kind of 




     D D     D   
 
D: : ...most everything 
that the company does is 
to look good for the 
shareholders and I think 
that’s the way most 
companies are so yah 
they promote it, they 
don’t want people to be 
injured but a lot of it is to 
look good for the 
shareholders. I think so, I 
think that’s the main 
reason they promote it, is 











Does not lead by 
example 
B B  B B    B  B    
B: "...you know we all 
talk and did you see this 
manager he didn’t have 
this on, he doesn’t have 
that on, how come we got 
to have it on if they, and 
they’re promoting and 
giving us a hard time 
about it..." 




D D    D       D  
D: “it comes down to 
them preaching the 
safety. If they’re 
preaching the safety you 
should be able to go to 
them with a safety 
concern. It’s just all 
concerns that we come up 
with, a lot of them are, 
never seem to be 
addressed, so. We tell 
them, but there just 
doesn’t seem to be 
anything done about it. 
Some of the little easier 
things, yah they tend to 
get on to that pretty 
quick. Some things that 
take a little bit of a 
commitment on time, 
manpower, finances, 






Pressure for work 
overrides value 
for safety 
 D D D  D D  D   D  D 
 
D: "I know a lot of senior 
management they like to 
preach safety but from 
my experiences, they like 
to preach it (21:28) until 
it starts slowing down 
production. That’s when 
it seems to kind of go out 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
oh don’t worry about 
that, it’s like this is what 
matters right now type 
thing, like. It’s like they 
preach one thing one 
minute, and the next 
thing it doesn’t matter, 
so." 
Turns a blind eye D  D D    D    D B  
B: "getting in and driving 
away from someone 
being unsafe, or they 
would not even talk about 
it. They change subjects 
when it comes to, a 
subject factor [about 
safety]  
D: "that would be very 
upsetting to me if I knew 
that senior management 
knew of certain [piece of 
equipment] or something 
that could blow up or 
whatever, or a [worksite] 
wasn’t safe [...] they 
knew about it and they 










allocate money to 




D D D D  D     D D  D 
 
D: "I would say the 
greatest disregard they 
show for safety is the fact 
with maintenance, like 
how they’ve cut back so 
much, they’ve cut back 
every department and 
they don’t like keep 
things up, maintain. I 
would say that’s where 
they show the greatest 
disregard, it’s all about 
the shareholders and 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
they cut back? They cut 
back on maintenance. " 
Allocates money 






 D             
D: "...we wanted that 
stuff fixed right, seemed 
pretty simple, they don’t 
do it and then they go out 
and buy you know all 
these little stickers that 
they put everywhere that 
says you are responsible 
for your own safety. And 
I asked like how much 
they paid for it she said 
like $1000 or something, 
I said you could have 
used that to fix some 
lights right. We don’t 
need stickers everywhere 
telling us what we 
already know right." 
Shuts down 
safety programs 
to reduce costs 
      D        
 
D: "we’ve had numerous 
incidents with 
derailments in the last 
year or more (36:09), and 
that all costs us big 
dollars, and they recoup 
any way they can so they 
shut off this program, 
shut off that program, 
shut off that program, 
you have to recoup that 
money in order to keep 
your stocks going up, my 
view right but I was 
never told it was shut 
down because of the 

















   D        D  D 
 
D: "they try to run the 
company with as few 
employees as they can, as 
tight a ship as they can, 
so you know they don’t, 
a lot of times they won’t 
have any extra men 
around like an incident 
like that happens, they, if 








does not reflect a 
value for safety 
     D       D  
 
D: "they have these 
things they call coaching 
letters, like they’ll give 
you after they spot you 
doing something unsafe, 
you’ll get one, although it 
might be a week later, 
saying that, like you were 
found doing something 
unsafe and this is 
basically an informal 
notice saying that you 
weren’t doing it the 
proper way, but at the 
same time it goes on your 
permanent record. So 
they’re saying it’s an 
informal notice but it’s 
still going on your 
permanent record..." 
Hiring process 
does not reflect a 
value for safety 
     D D    D    
 
D: "it’s definitely looked 
at that way because 
they’ll bring somebody 
in, when they hire people 
they won’t necessarily 
hire within the company, 
they’ll bring in somebody 





Theme Subtheme Code P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Example 
may not be qualified for 
the position at all" 
Safety rules do 
not reflect a 
value for safety 
D D  D D        D  
 
D: "we have different 
rules for different people 
at different places, like I 
work for [my 
department], I have to 
wear a hard hat in the 
yard. [A different 
department member] 
comes in, I can be 
standing right beside like 
this [...] if I don’t have 
my hard hat on I’m in 
trouble. You’re not 






Appendix I  
Table of Responses for Indirect Message Source and Characteristics 




Information inferred from a lack of 
safety incidents/accidents at the 
worksite 
   x           
Information inferred from experience 
at the worksite (e.g., supervisor and 
middle management leadership 
practices) 
x x  x  x x    x x  x 
Information/stories from colleagues     x     x      
Information/stories from colleagues’ 
experience/disposition 
   x      x     
Information/stories from family        x       
Information/stories from other 
informants (e.g., stranger) 
      x        
Information/stories from 
supervisor/middle management 
x x x   x    x x  x  
Online video media (online 
presentation by senior management) 
       x  x     
Overheard information/stories (e.g., 
overheard phone calls) 
     x     x   x 
Printed article from organization  
(e.g., organizational magazine, 
newsletter, poster) 
x x x x x x x x x x  x x  
Printed media (e.g., news story in 
newspaper) 
         x     
Written article on company website         x x     
 
 Characteristic P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
Message 
Characteristics 
Abundance of messages  x  x           
Direct (message focused only on 
safety) 
   x      x     
Indirect (message intertwined with 
other information) 
x    x  x        
Media (video)        x  x     
Verbal (in person) x x  x x    x x     
Verbal (over phone)     x    x  x  x  
Written (addressed to many) x x x x x x x x x x  x x  






Table of Responses for Sender and Receiver Characteristics 
Sender 
Characteristics 
Characteristic P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
Ability to move on x  x  x          
Appreciative            x   
Arrogant            x   
Asks questions             x  
Bull-shitter   x            
Caring/compassionate/altruistic   x   x         
Confident             x  
Considers consequences before speaking x              
Credible             x  
Engaged x              
Fails to take responsibility  x  x          x 
Fair             x  
Friendly        x     x  
Good communicator x   x x          
Good listener               
Good public speaker        x       
Happy/smiling   x            
Honest/genuine/authentic x  x  x x    x     
Humble   x  x          
Insecure            x   
Lack of care/compassion     x          
Lack of knowledge     x x x  x  x  x  
Lack of relationship x x x   x x x  x x x x  
Lack of respect x    x x         
Likeness/Similarity             x  
Looks out for you              x 
Open/approachable  x x  x     x     
Poor communicator    x           
Professional        x       
Relationship x x  x x   x  x x x x  
Reliable  x             
Respectful    x        x   
Smart/knowledgeable x  x          x x 
Takes responsibility        x       
Trustworthy            x   












Characteristic P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 
Faith in accuracy       x        
Information has a lack of meaning  x             
Information is relevant/intriguing  x x          x  
Information is relevant/intriguing  x x          x  
Information not relevant  x             
Information viewed negatively  x     x  x x x   x 
Lack of trust      x         
Nervous    x           
Questioning (source) accuracy x x x x   x  x  x    
